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INTRODUCTION

One of the fundamental goals of a patent system is to encourage the research
and development of the most socially valuable inventions-those innovations
that will produce the greatest benefits for society at large. If the government
could determine in advance which inventions are most socially valuable, it
could simply offer direct rewards for their development.' That the United States
has chosen to employ patents rather than direct rewards to encourage innovation
reflects a decision to decentralize the task of picking winners. This policy
choice is premised on the notion that, if inventors or the market are in a better
position than the government to identify valuable innovations, the government
should delegate the task by granting inventors a patent as a reward for innovation.2 Patents entitle inventors to monopoly profits from an innovation, and
monopoly profits tend to increase as the social value of an innovation increases. 4 Thus, the patent system generally encourages inventors to work on
what they believe will be the most valuable inventions.

1. See Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual PropertyRights, 44 J.L.
& EcoN. 525, 534-36 (2001); see also Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanismfor Encouraging

Innovation, 113 Q.J. EcON. 1137, 1137-38 (1998) ("Under symmetric information and full commitment, the first-best solution to underprovision of ideas is subsidizing research, rather than creating a
new set of monopoly price distortions through the patent system. However, before research is
conducted, the government may not know the costs and expected benefits of research, and may not
even be able to conceive of some inventions." (citations omitted)).
2. Of course, there are other reasons one might still prefer a reward system to a patent system. For
example, a reward system that released the innovation into the public domain would impose less
deadweight loss to welfare. The information advantage of inventors is a necessary but not sufficient
condition to preferring patents over rewards.
3. Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 1, at 529.
4. This claims rests on the absence of any a priori reason why the fraction of social surplus extracted
by a monopolist rises or falls with the size of that surplus. See infra section I.A.
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This rationale for choosing a patent system over a reward system explains
why the government may choose to grant patents in the first place. It does not
explain, however, why the government sometimes takes patents away after they
have been granted. These patent revocations are commonly triggered when the
defendant in a patent infringement case successfully challenges the validity of
the patent held by the plaintiff.5 The logic behind patent challenges and
revocations is that the government, when implementing a patent system, might
accidentally give out patents to entities that did not innovate or did not need a
reward in order to innovate.6 Such invalid patents have no upside: they do not
encourage innovation, and they impose deadweight losses on welfare. In short,
patent challenges weed out invalid patents.
There are two problems, however, with patent challenges. In some cases they
impose costs on valid patents, and in other cases they fail against invalid
patents. These flaws stem from two sources. First, infringers occasionally bring
challenges even when patents are valid, causing the holders of valid patents to
bear litigation costs in responding to a patent challenge. At the same time,
alleged infringers may fail to challenge all holders of invalid patents, allowing
these patents to continue imposing deadweight loss. Second, occasionally courts
may make an error when judging whether a patent is valid or invalid. This may
cause the holder of what is truly a valid patent to lose that patent or allow an
invalid patent to stand. These failures decrease the ex ante returns to any
innovation that deserves a valid patent, undermining the incentives at the core
of the patent system, and increase the social costs of the patent system.
Moreover, these failures are most acute in cases involving the most socially
valuable patents and the largest firms. Whereas the patent system seeks to

5. Patents can also be revoked via administrative proceedings before the Patent and Trademark
Office. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-329 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
6. The likely reason for these mistakes is that the Patent and Trademark Office must make decisions
regarding which applicants deserve patents with very little information about their innovation beyond
that which the applicant itself provides. Peer review does not come until later, when profit sharing
becomes a motive for an infringer to provide the government with more balanced information about the
validity of a patent. See infra section I.B.
7. Scholars have criticized patent law for making mistakes in weeding out socially worthless patents.
The gist of the argument is that the criteria patent law employs to judge the validity of, say, utility
patents-novelty, non-obviousness, and utility-do not perfectly identify those innovations that improve social welfare, as an economist might define it. Accordingly, the argument goes, these criteria do
not successfully induce valuable innovation while deterring socially worthless research. See, e.g., FED.
TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNovATIoN: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
PoLIcY 6-8 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf;
JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND

ITs

DIscOwrENTs: How

OuR

ADAM B. JAFFE &

BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM

Is ENDANGERING

INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To Do ABouT IT 24-35 (2004); Jay Dratler, Jr., Alice in
Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38 AKRON L. REV. 299 (2005). We share these concerns, but

we have little to add to them and they do not affect the arguments we make later in the text about the
problem with patent challenges and potential reforms to improve those challenges. Therefore, we
proceed under the assumption that the law determining which patents are valid operates as a reasonable
proxy for which patents (and the inventions they protect) increase social welfare. We shall focus instead
on errors in application of that law by courts.
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decentralize the choice of innovation, patent litigation also decentralizes the
decision to challenge a patent. Specifically, it delegates the decision to private
parties, ideally potential entrants into the patent holder's market. However, there
may be few firms in a position to challenge a patent and large fixed litigation
costs to filing a challenge. Thus, challengers tend to target holders of the most
profitable and (and often most socially valuable) patents.' Smaller patent holders are particularly vulnerable because they cannot afford substantial litigation
costs. By implication, challengers tend to avoid taking on larger firms because
there is a lower likelihood of succeeding against even an invalid patent held by
such firms.9 This discourages innovation at smaller firms and tolerates socially
harmful patents held by larger firms.
At bottom, the problems with patent challenges are primarily attributable to
judicial and administrative errors. If the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
granted only valid patents, or if the courts could be trusted to uphold all valid
patents and strike down all invalid ones, our system of patent challenges would
function almost perfectly. Yet errors are endemic throughout all levels of the
process. The PTO issues scores of invalid patents every year,o and the federal
courts are notoriously inaccurate when adjudicating patent validity."
If judicial and administrative inaccuracy is the disease, then improving that
accuracy would seem the most obvious cure. Indeed, proposals to reduce the
error rate within the federal courts and the PTO are legion and involve everything from increased funding and technical training to full-scale restructuring of
the judicial process. 12 Nonetheless, the patent system's endemic errors and
inaccuracies have proven notoriously resilient in the face of ongoing ameliora-

8. C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J.
EMPUCAL LEGAL STUo. 613, 632 (2011).

9. Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 45 Hous. L. REV.

1201, 1234 (2008) (detailing numerous advantages of large firms over small firms in the use of
intellectual property for profit and in litigation).
10. E.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 7, at 32-33 (describing a patent granted based on the

"determination that surrounding jam with peanut butter so the bread will not get soggy is a new idea,
and one that was not previously obvious to skilled sandwich-makers"); Mark A. Lemley, Essay,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 & n.1 (2001) ("Complaints are

legion."); Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What To Do About Bad Patents?,
REGULATION, Winter 2005-2006, at 10, 10 (2005) ("Bad patents are everywhere."); Doug Lichtman &
Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REv. 45, 47 (2007)

(arguing that PTO grants "patents that . .. should never have been issued" because of presumption of
validity in judicial review); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589

(1999) (noting that "patents for 'business methods' implemented in software .. . are of extremely poor
quality"); Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities,51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 676 (2009)

(describing how "PTO struggles to improve examination quality").
11. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REv. 223, 258-59 (2008) (demonstrating that even

sophisticated and experienced federal courts struggle with patent cases).
12. We describe and offer a critique of these various proposals in section HI.A, infra.
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tive efforts.13 It may be that there are upper limits to the level of precision that
generalist judges can bring to a system involving such technically complex
subject matters, for instance. 14
In this Article, we suggest that it might be possible to improve the value of
patent challenges even without increasing their accuracy. Put simply, we propose raising the stakes involved in patent litigation. A patent owner who
prevails at trial should collect enhanced rewards, above and beyond the damages the owner would normally be paid in compensation for the infringement. A
patent owner whose patent is invalidated at trial should be forced to pay
significantly enhanced penalties. At first glance, our proposal might seem
entirely counterintuitive. If patent adjudications are riddled with errors, one
would think that it would be preferable to lower the stakes involved, rather than
increase them. Scholars and courts have generally confined themselves to that
approach. 1

Yet contrary to the conventional wisdom, we demonstrate that enhanced
rewards and penalties can correct many of the flaws inherent to patent challenges even without affecting the accuracy of the adjudications themselves.
They accomplish this by restoring patent holders' net expected trial outcomes to
appropriate levels.' 6 Enhanced rewards would compensate holders of valid,
valuable patents for the risks they run at trial. This would incentivize the
optimal amount of research and innovation, as well as continued research on the
most socially valuable inventions. At the same time, enhanced penalties would
reduce or eliminate invalid patent owners' opportunities to earn positive returns
at trial, vastly diminishing their incentives to assert their invalid patents in the
first place.17
13. See, e.g., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al.

eds., 2004) (describing a continuing crisis within the patent system); Peter S. Menell, The Property
Rights Movement's Embrace of IntellectualProperty: True Love or Doomed Relationship?,34 ECOLOGY

L.Q. 713, 737 (2007) (describing "a growing patent crisis"); see also Schwartz, supra note 11, at
258-59 (demonstrating that judges to not appear to improve as they gain experience with patent cases).
14. See infra section Il.A.
15. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
16. In a way, our proposal is related to Gary Becker's observation that deterrence is a function of the
probability of apprehension times the fine paid upon apprehension. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON. 169, 172, 180 (1968). Focusing on improving

the accuracy of courts is akin to changing the probability of apprehension, although our proposal to
raise stakes is akin to changing the criminal fine. Our proposal is also related, though less directly, to
Keith Hylton's observation that the enforcer's dilemma that plaintiffs face can be overcome by type II
errors by courts. In other words, plaintiffs can be encouraged to litigate by courts who accidentally rule
for them. See Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6 J.L. EcoN. &

ORG. 433, 434 (1990). We make an opposite point: court (and PTO) errors in favor of patent holders can
be overcome by increasing the penalties that invalid patent holders pay when their patent is invalidated.
17. Our proposal resembles, but is distinct from, the English Rule, which requires that the losing
party in a civil litigation compensate the prevailing party for its direct litigation costs. First, our remedy
allows an increase in damages that substantially exceed the cost of litigation. Second, we advocate
disconnecting the amount that the prevailing party received from the amount that the losing party pays.
For example, we advocate giving prevailing patent holders patent extensions, though those patent
extensions would not be paid for by infringers. See infra section III.D.
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The enhanced rewards and penalties we propose would thus allow our
imperfect patent system to mimic one in which courts erred less frequently.
Patent owners-be they genuine innovators or patent trolls-and their competitors would behave as if they could rely upon the courts to reach the correct
outcome in essentially every case. The system would generate substantial
benefits to innovation and competition at minimal cost. Where direct efforts to
improve judicial accuracy have failed, raising the stakes of patent cases might
yet succeed.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the manner in which patents
direct research and innovation toward the most socially valuable inventions and
describes the value of patent challenges. Part II analyzes the problems created
by patent challenges when courts err in assessing the validity of patents. Part III
presents our proposal for enhanced rewards and penalties and offers a theoretical demonstration of its ability to realign research and litigation incentives. Part
IV suggests a useful refinement that would involve tailoring the availability of
enhanced remedies and penalties to particular industries or technical fields and
examines several important issues surrounding the implementation and effects
of our approach.
I. THE LOGIC BEHIND PATENTS AND PATENT CHALLENGES

In this Part, we first examine the rationale behind the existence of patents and
then the process by which patents are granted and revoked.
A. PATENTS AND PROPORTIONAL REWARDS

The patent system is premised on the idea that an inventor's payoff for
innovation should be proportional to the ex post social surplus from that
innovation. 18 Our evidence is that the payoff to the inventor of possessing a
patent is the monopoly profits from having the exclusive right to market her
innovation. Monopoly profits are not special in and of themselves. Indeed,
monopoly pricing is in general associated with deadweight loss to welfare,
which is typically considered a cost of the patent system. However, monopoly
profits have the useful feature that they roughly scale with the social surplus
from an innovation. In other words, the patent on an innovation with twice the
social value of another will typically generate twice the monopoly profits of the
other. The reason is that, of the factors that determine monopoly profits (the
level of demand, the slope of demand, the ability to price discriminate, and
competition from other patents), only the level of demand must a priori scale
with social value. 19 There is no theoretical reason why the other factors are

18. By ex post social surplus, we mean the consumer-plus-producer surplus from an invention after
it is developed. This surplus excludes the cost of research required to develop the invention.
19. For a definition of consumer surplus and its relationship to both the demand curve and social
welfare, see Daniel T. Slesnick, EmpiricalApproaches to the Measurement of Welfare, 36 J. EcoN.

LrrERATuRE 2108, 2110-13 (1998).
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correlated with the ex post social surplus from an invention.
The reason why the patent system seeks to scale rewards with ex post social
surplus is not primarily that this scaling is, in general, the optimal strategy for
encouraging innovation. It is easy enough to see that, for example, if there are
diminishing returns to rewards or increasing cost to the use of rewards, then
rewards should be roughly concave in the ex post surplus from an innovation.20
Rewards in turn may have diminishing returns because individuals have diminishing marginal utility of income and thus inventors exert less incremental effort
as reward rises. 2 1 And the cost of rewards may be increasing if there are fixed
costs to entering a patent race, so that multiple inventors only compete when the
reward is large enough to cover their fixed costs.
Rather, the main reason why the patent system provides rewards that are
proportional to ex post social surplus from an innovation is that the government
does not know which innovations actually enhance social welfare. The system
functions under the assumption that potential inventors and the market have
better knowledge about the value of their invention. To encourage inventors to
exert most of their effort on developing innovations that are socially productive,
the system uses the incentive of a reward that scales with ex post social
surplus.2 2 In other words, the proportional reward from patents is the solution to
a principal-agent problem in which the principal is the government and the
agent is an inventor. The agent has private information on which project yields
the greatest surplus. The government incentivizes the agent to choose the
project that is most valuable by giving her a fixed portion of surplus from the
project she chooses (and completes).
To illustrate this point, consider a principal-agent model where the agent may
work on either of two projects, 0 or 1. Due to time constraints, the agent cannot

20. We can demonstrate this with a simple model similar to that employed by Shavell & van
Ypersele, supra note 1, at 530-32. Suppose the probability of generating an invention is p(r) where r is
the reward for an innovation, V is the social value from an invention, c(r) is the cost of providing a
reward. Costs might include the costs of a patent race or simply the costs of administering a patent
system. The social welfare accounting for the reward is W = p(r)V - c(r). The level of reward that
maximizes social welfare satisfies the condition p'(r)S = c'(r), that is, the marginal benefits of rewards
must equal their marginal costs. Because rewards r and social value V are complements, i.e., d 2W/drdV
= p'(r)> 0, and the upper bound on rewards, r < V, increases with V, the optimal reward is increasing
in the social value of the innovation by Topkis's Monotonicity Theorem. Donald M. Topkis, Minimizing
a Submodular Function on a Lattice, 26 OPERArIONs REs. 305, 317 (1978). Moreover, it is easily
verified that, unless p(r) and c(r) are linear or the upper bound on rewards is binding, the optimal
reward is nonlinear.
21. This concern vanishes if innovations are created by firms which are held by diversified
shareholders and thus do not experience diminishing marginal utility of income. Of course, some
innovations are made by individuals or privately held firms with limited shareholders. And even in large
corporations, agency problems between managers and shareholders can mimic the results from diminishing marginal utility of income. This is most evident when the chief executive is paid a fraction of
profits; because the chief executive experiences diminishing returns and controls the corporation, the
corporation will behave as if it has diminishing returns. See also JEAN TIRoLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTIAL ORGANIZATION 42 (1988).
22. The reward also incorporates the cost of research and development.
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work on both. The cost to the agent of working on either project is the same, c,
and her reservation wage is normalized to 0. If executed, projects have payoffs
of 00 > 0 and 01 = 0o + e, respectively, where E takes a value of 1 or - 1 with
equal probability. Suppose that both principal and agent know the payoff to
project 0, but only the agent knows the value of E before any project is
undertaken, that is, Oo is common knowledge but the agent has private information on e. 3 The payoff to the principal is Oo + f 1IE - w(Oo, [ i) where HI is an
indicator for whether the agent chose project 1 and w is a wage that may depend
on information available to the principal, namely, the value of project 0 and
whether the agent works on project 0 or 1. We assume a risk-neutral agent who
obtains a payoff of w(0o, H1) - c if she works on either project and 0, her
reservation wage, if she does not. It is easy to verify that the principal's optimal
strategy is to sell the choice between projects (as well as the return to the
projects) to the agent for a cost of 00 and the agent will accept because E(E)
R = 0. This equilibrium also coincides with the first best because the agent is
risk neutral. 24 For our purposes, the result shows that when the agent has private
information on the value of projects, she should be incentivized to choose the
right one by giving a wage equal to payoff from the projects, even if the cost of
research and development are the same for both projects.25
B. PATENTABILITY STANDARDS, PATENT APPLICATIONS, AND PATENT CHALLENGES

The above rationale for the patent system assumes, first, that innovations do
not occur without rewards and, second, that patents end up in the hands of
people who develop innovations. Neither assumption is appropriate in all cases.
Some innovations emerge without explicit rewards, or at least without rewards
from the government. 26 Prominent examples include academic medical research, freeware software,2 8 and fashion innovations.2 9 Moreover, parties who
23. The principal may not know the payoff to project 1 either because the payoff goes to some other
third party the principal cares about or because it is realized well after a wage must be paid to the agent.
24. If the agent is risk averse and the principal did not observe e, it would still be the optimal
strategy for the principal to offer to sell the choice and payoffs to the agent for 0o. However, because the
agent suffers a utility loss from the random variable e, this strategy is not first best. The principal will
not sell for less than 0o to provide the agent with some compensating insurance because the principal
would do better by simply offering the agent a small positive wage (lower than the contemplated price
discount) to work on project 0 and no wage to work on project 1.
25. If the agent were risk averse and the principal received a noisy but informative signal about e,
which proxies for social surplus, there is no a priori reason why the contract would be concave or
convex in that signal.
26. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Ziv Shafir, Who Chooses Open-Source Software?, 78 U. Cm. L.

REv. 139 (2011) (describing the intersection of academic research and open source software); Ira V.
Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1487,

1504-07 (1997) (discussing the history of freeware and its philosophical opposition to traditional
intellectual property rights).
27. Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n., Ethical Issues in the Patenting of
Medical Procedures,53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341, 349 (1998) (rejecting "the argument that the patenting
of medical processes is necessary to enable and promote [medical] procedural advances" and arguing
that decades of medical advancement occurred "despite the absence of medical process patents");
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have developed an innovation may not be able to demonstrate that they did so
and parties who did not develop an innovation have an incentive to claim they
did to obtain market power. If parties innovate in the midst of competition, they
may accidentally release the innovation in the public domain before filing the
paperwork required to secure patent rights over the innovation.3 0 On the flip
side, there are frequent complaints about "patent trolls" or "non-practicing
entities" (NPEs) who either patent ideas that require little research or purchase
patents based on others' research, then do not make any risky investment to
develop those patented ideas.3 1 Instead, critics contend, an NPE waits until
some other party takes the expense and risk to commercialize these ideas and, if
the other party is successful, files an infringement suit to extract a portion of the
latter's profits. 32
A well-functioning patent system must have a way to ensure that patents are
not granted when they are either unnecessary or undeserved. The U.S. patent
system, like many others around the world,3 3 solves these problems in two
Wendy W. Yang, Note, PatentPolicy and Medical Procedure Patents: The Case for Statutory Exclusion

from Patentability, 1 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 5 para. 17 (1995) (arguing that the inherent incentives of
the scientific community can supplant "economic incentive[s] provided by patent monopolies").
28. See Heffan, supra note 26, at 1504-07.
29. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual
Pmperty in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REv. 1687, 1689 (2006).

30. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (patent is invalid if the invention was published
or in public use more than one year before the patent application was filed). In March 2012, the
provisions of the America Invents Act amending § 102 section came into effect, generally replacing the
one-year provision with a bar of public disclosure or use at any time before the patent's effective filing
date, subject to certain exceptions. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011).
In the pharmaceutical industry, the problem of innovators being unable to secure patent rights is
particularly acute. Pharmaceutical development involves both discovery of a molecule and demonstration that it is effective at treating humans in clinical trial. Patents are granted, however, after discovery
and before the trials. Moreover, a single molecule may have multiple medical applications, not all
evident when the molecule was discovered. If the idea for a particular application lags substantially
behind the discovery, the molecule may enter the public domain (become generic) before the particular
application is demonstrated. In other words, the innovative but belated application cannot be protected
by patent rights. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87

TEX. L. REv. 503, 519-21 (2009).
31. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants,

99 GEO. L.J. 677, 691-95 (2011) (detailing the practices of "patent trolls" and their litigation habits).
32. See Walter 0. Alomar-Jim6nez, HarmonizingEbay, 1 U. P.R. Bus. L.J. 17, 24 (2010) (explaining
that the modi operandi of patent trolls is "not invest[ing] in research and development (R&D) to create
their inventions," purchasing patents "cheaply," monitoring the "technology field of his acquired
patents," suing "defendant-infringer[s]," and "demanding a licensing fee"); Christopher A. Harkins,
Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A Novel "Cold Fusion" Defense Because Changing
Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 407, 407 (2007) ("Instead of commercializing products,

patent trolls buy up patents (oftentimes older paper patents), wait for the technology and industry to
grow up around the patent, and then use the patent as a holdup device for extorting money from
would-be defendants wishing to avoid the exorbitant costs of defending against an overreaching
broadly claimed invention.").
33. For a description of the European patent system, see generally Patrick Coyle, Note, Uniform
Patent Litigation in the European Union: An Analysis of the Viability of Recent Proposals Aimed at
Unifying the European PatentLitigation System, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL S'ruD. L. REv. 171 (2012). For

comparisons of the United States, European, and Japanese patent systems, see generally John R.
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complementary ways. First, it sets up criteria to judge when an innovation
deserves a patent. Specifically, the creation must be novel, nonobvious, and
have some utility.34 These doctrines, particularly the requirements of novelty
and nonobviousness, 35 are meant to determine whether an invention has actually contributed any new knowledge to the world. The patent system then
relies upon inventors' incentives in the marketplace to ensure that the invention
is socially valuable. If the invention has no value, there will be no market for it
and no reason to invest resources in creating it in the first place. If the invention
is valuable and nonobvious, then the inventor has presumably contributed some
valuable knowledge and with it some social surplus. Patent law's doctrines thus
provide reasonable standards for judging when a patent is unnecessary or
undeserved-at least when they function correctly.37
Second, the patent system applies these criteria at two different points during
the lifecycle of an innovation." Before a product is commercialized, an
inventor may apply for a patent with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).
Thomas, Litigation Beyond the Technological Frontier: Comparative Approaches to Multinational
PatentEnforcement, 27 LAW & POt'Y INT'L Bus. 277, 282-88 (1996).

34. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 103 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
35. Utility only plays a meaningful role at the patent-granting stage for biotechnology and chemistry
patents. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Lw, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575,

1644-46 (2003) ("In the last several decades ... the utility requirement has lost much of its
force. .. .The only exceptions are biology and chemistry."). Even then, it mainly serves to prevent a
firm from patenting a compound (or genetic sequence) at too early a stage. The judgment is that it
would be a mistake to allow one firm to lock up a compound before they have any real use for it,
removing it from the public domain as a subject for study. But even here the utility hurdle is not all that
high. Demonstrated in vitro effects are enough to overcome it. In vivo effects on mice are also enough.
See also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that even chemical similarity to
other effective compounds is enough).
36. See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to "promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries").
37. Of course, some scholars question whether the standards for patentability perfectly correlate
with the necessity and deservedness of patents. We addressed this point in note 7, supra.
38. See Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in PatentLaw, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 735, 746-49 (2012).

39. Inventors file patent applications prior to commercialization for two basic reasons. First, once a
product is commercialized, the PTO might find that it is no longer novel. See Richard H. Stem, The
Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1229, 1249 (1986) ("The subject matter

of a patent must be novel, [that is] .. . not disclosed in any prior publication or commercial product . . . ."). Thus commercialization may preclude a successful patent application. Noel Courage,
Sharing the (Genetic) Wealth, 35 TEx. Iir'L L.J. 123, 123-24 (2000) (reviewing KRISHNA R. DRONAMRAJU, BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL SSUESS IN BIoTECHNOLOGY SHAIG (1998)) ("[S]cientifically novel inventions are not patentable [when] ... the invention was publicly disclosed prior to filing a patent
application. Inventions lacking legal novelty are barred from patent protection...." (footnote omitted)). Second, without a patent, the inventor will face competition during the commercialization
process. This may reduce the returns to commercialization. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy,
The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1648 (2011) ("A patent on a nascent

technology ... can give the patentee 'an incentive to make investments to maximize the value of the
patent without fear that the fruits of the investment will produce unpatentable information appropriable
by competitors' . . . ." (quoting Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20
J.L. & EcON. 265, 276 (1977)); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing

Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REv. 697, 709-10 (2001) (describing the effects of competition in the

2013]

RAISING THE STAKES

647

The office has been criticized, however, for granting too many patent applications.40 One reason is limited resources. The PTO's review is relatively cursory
because it receives a large number of applications but is shortstaffed.4 1 In
addition, the PTO only has the information provided by the patent applicant and
whatever limited information the patent examiner is able to discover on her
own. 4 2 Another reason is poor incentives. PTO examiners lack the incentives to
conduct extensive searches for prior art, and their searches are notoriously less
complete and successful than the searches performed by opposing parties in the
course of litigation.
Moreover, the PTO has a stronger incentive to accept applications than reject
them. If the agency accepts the patent application, it is unlikely any party will
directly complain about the PTO's decision. The work typically has not been
marketed, and competitors have not emerged. By the time a competitor does
emerge, the validity of the patent will have shifted from the jurisdiction of the
PTO to that of the federal courts (typically the Federal Circuit), where the
matter will likely arise as an infringement action against the competitor. However, if the patent application is rejected, the applicant has an incentive immediately to appeal the PTO's decision. The PTO, seeking to avoid the cost of
appeals and the shame of reversal, errs on the side of granting applications.4
Patentability criteria (novelty, value, nonobviousness) may be applied a
second time after the patent has been granted. A typical case is where a
competitor emerges with a product similar to that described in a patent, and the
patent holder files a lawsuit alleging patent infringement. In order for a patent to
have value when asserted against a competitor, it must of course be both valid
and infringed. Therefore, as a defense, the competitor may assert that the
plaintiff's patent is, in fact, invalid.4 5 If the court agrees, the plaintiff's patent is

commercialization process and noting the additional costs borne by the innovating party due to
competition).
40. See supra note 10. However, it is possibly that this lax screening is socially optimal. See infra
Part I; see also Lemley, supra note 10, at 1495 n.1.
41. Lemley, supra note 10, at 1499-1500.
42. Id. at 1500.
43. Merges, supra note 10, at 603 (describing patent examiner incentives); Kristen Dietly, Note,
Lightening the Load: Whether the Burden of Prooffor Overcoming A Patent's Presumption of Validity

Should Be Lowered, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2615, 2655-56 (2010) (discussing the weaknesses of PTO
examinations and arguing against the presumption of deference to the PTO).
44. See Jonathan Masur, PatentInflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 474 (2011).

45. As we will reiterate below, we need not define a patent challenge to require an assertion that a
patent is invalid. When an infringement suit is filed, the alleged infringer will simultaneously assert that
the patent is invalid and, if valid, not infringed. A patent challenge can equally take the form of an
argument that the competing product does not infringe the patent. A finding of noninfringement,
however, may not always be as damaging to patent holders as a finding of invalidity. After all, the
patent holder can always assert the patent against some other party. But in many cases the two have the
same functional effect and the same stakes. For instance, "patent trolls" often sue multiple defendantsany firm that might be infringing their patents-simultaneously. Matthew Fawcett & Jeremiah Chan,
March of the Trolls: Footsteps Getting Louder, 13 INTELL. PRop. L. BULL. 1, 18-19 (2008). But see 35

U.S.C. § 299 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (curbing this practice for lawsuits adjudicated after the passage of
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effectively revoked. This is the canonical example of what we call a "patent
challenge" by a private party, in this case a competitor.46
This is not the only way a patent challenge can play out. A firm that wishes to
challenge a patent can pursue a number of different options, including filing a
declaratory judgment action before getting sued for infringement. Alternatively,
in the pharmaceutical sector, the challenging firm need not even market a
product in order to infringe on a patent. All that is required is the filing of an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to obtain Food and Drug Administration approval to market a generic version of a previously approved "branded"
drug. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the application alone constitutes grounds
for the maker of the branded drug to assert a patent infringement claim. 4 7
The primary rationale for revisiting a patent grant in this manner is that, for
the reasons described above, the PTO grants many patents that are either
unnecessary or undeserved. This rationale does not, however, explain why the
PTO delegates the authority to trigger a patent challenge to private parties rather
than simply revisiting its own decision after some time.4 8 In some sense the
delegation is consistent with the move by the patent system to decentralize the
decision of innovations by allowing inventors to apply for patents rather than
offering rewards for innovations chosen by the government. But decentralization by itself is not a virtue.

the America Invents Act). Part of the reason patent holders bring suit against every conceivable
infringer simultaneously is that sequential lawsuits raise the probability of the patent being invalidated
in one suit and thus rendered unusable in future lawsuits. In such a suit, a general finding of
noninfringement has the same effect as a finding of invalidity. In addition, a court's interpretation of a
patent's claims is often simultaneously determinative of both validity and infringement. The two
doctrines thus function frequently as substitutes: if the court interprets the claims broadly, the patent is
invalid, and if it interprets them narrowly, the patent is not infringed. Accordingly, we will treat these
two doctrines mainly as substitutes for purposes of the discussion that follows.
46. We hasten to add that we mean no normative judgment in describing these suits as "challenges."
Firms assert a great number of invalid patents every year; they also commonly attempt to interpret their
own patents overly broadly in order to capture as much productive economic conduct as possible. Dan
L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1743, 1765-70 (2009); Ian A. Lampl, EstablishingRules for Resolving Markman Failures,

72 U. CHI. L. REv. 1025, 1038-39 (2005). In these instances, patent challenges are highly socially
valuable.
47. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the generic drug
maker must demonstrate that its drug is bioequivalent to the branded drug and certify that it does not
infringe on the branded drug's patent before it can obtain the approval of the Food and Drug
Administration to market its product through the ANDA process. As a reward for encouraging generic
drug entry, the statute gives the first generic maker to file for entry into a market 180 days during which
it exclusively may compete against the branded drug. This incentive encourages generic companies to
file for entry before the branded drug's patent naturally expires (twenty years after it is granted). Once
the generic files an ANDA, the branded company has forty-five days to file an infringement suit. See 21
U.S.C.

§

355(j)(5)(B) (2006); C. Scott Hemphill, Payingfor Delay: PharmaceuticalPatent Settlement

as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1553, 1560-61 (2006) (summarizing generic entry
under Hatch-Waxman).
48. The PTO could also restrict its review to patents with positive economic value by only reviewing
patents that pay their maintenance fee. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b)-(c) (2006). If a patent has zero value, it is
unlikely that the holder will pay the maintenance fee.
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A better justification is that allowing another private party to challenge a
patent addresses the ex parte nature of the PTO approval process. 49 prvate
parties often have better information about which patents are invalid and
stronger incentives to search for relevant information and litigate vigorously.
Accordingly, a patent challenge is typically brought by a private party that
wishes to market a good similar to that described in the patent. Such a party will
only exist if the patented work has positive economic value and will litigate
only if the patent imposes an economic cost on them. This reduces the risk that
court resources will be wasted on screening zero-cost patents. These arguments
are similar to the theoretical arguments given for case-or-controversy and
standing requirements that define who may litigate cases generally.50
II. THE

FLAWS OF PATENT CHALLENGES

Although patent challenges may be necessary to weed out some invalid
patents, they have two important flaws. First, they sometimes result in valid
patents being invalidated ("false negatives"), thereby discouraging innovation.
Second, they sometimes fail against even invalid patents ("false positives"),
thereby allowing such patents to continue imposing costs on innovators and
consumers. We address these false negative and false positive problems in turn.
We pause to note that, here and elsewhere, we use the words "valid" and
"invalid" to mean "valid and infringed" and "invalid or not infringed," respectively. Both infringement and validity are, of course, necessary requirements
before a patent holder is entitled to damages or a licensing fee. We describe
these patents as valid and invalid as a matter of shorthand, but also to highlight
the importance of the validity decision to the value of the patent and the rights
of the patent owner going forward. A judgment of noninfringement may frustrate a patent owner in a single case but the patent might still be worthwhile
against other infringers, whereas a judgment of invalidity ends the patent's
useful life." Likewise, a patent challenger who obtains a judgment of noninfringement may or may not aid other potential challengers, whereas one who
succeeds in invalidating a patent has provided a public good that advantages
similarly situated parties.

49. For a discussion of the ex parte nature of patent examination, see Lemley, supra note 10, at
1524-25.
50. See Christian B. Sundquist, The First Principlesof Standing: Privilege, System Justification, and
the PredictableIncoherence ofArticle III, 1 COLUM. I. RACE & L. 119, 131 (2011) ("One classic defense

of standing doctrine relies on the ... argument that the standing requirements are necessary to ensure
that the judicial process is controlled by plaintiffs with a sufficient stake in the litigation.").
51. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (holding that once a
court has declared a patent invalid, the patent holder is estopped from asserting that the patent is valid
as against parties not involved in the original lawsuit).
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A. CHALLENGES AGAINST VALID PATENTS

When the owners of valid patents are forced into court, the consequences can

be severe. At minimum, such parties will be forced to pay litigation costs to
defend against validity challenges. More significantly, federal courts may mistakenly invalidate truly valid patents. Not only are the costs of litigation and the
risks of improper invalidation significant; they can also exert a differential
impact on some of the most important and vulnerable patent holders. First,
patent challengers tend to target the most profitable patents, imposing costs
disproportionately on the most socially valuable innovations. Second, patent
challengers also tend to target the smallest patent holders to maximize their
chance of victory. These tendencies diminish the fraction of social surplus from
an innovation that the patent holder captures, especially for the most valuable
innovations and the smallest innovators. This outcome is inconsistent with the
basic premise of the patent system, which is designed to allow inventors to
capture a greater percentage of the profits from their inventions as a means of
inducing innovation. It thus tends to undermine the value of the system.
1. Mistaken Challenges and Invalidation
Delegation of patent challenges to private parties has some benefits: better
knowledge about the costs of bad patents, better incentives to produce information on patents, and economizing on court resources. But even well-intentioned
private parties are not perfect. They may accidentally challenge patent holders
that have truly valid patents. A rough indicator of this-if one assumes that
courts make no errors-is that courts validate roughly 55% of patents that are
challenged. 5 2 On its face this suggests that the holders of over half of challenged patents must pay litigation costs even though the patents are valid, eating
into the deserved payoff.53
Of course, courts may accidentally validate truly invalid patents, implying
that the 55% validation rate is an overestimate of the errors that challengers
make when initiating suit. But, by the same token, courts may accidentally
invalidate truly valid patents, suggesting that the 45% invalidation rate may
include cases where valid patent holders were both incorrectly targeted by

52. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of LitigatedPatents, 26

AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998). At the same time, only 25% of patents in lawsuits are found valid and
infringed, which indicates that a somewhat higher percentage of patent challenges have merit. Mark A.
Lemley, The Fractioning of Patent Law, in INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAw

(Shyam-

krishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 2-3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid= 1895681.
53. The low number of patent trials (roughly 100 per year) may mask a high number of valid patents
that paid a cost due to challengers' targeting errors. See Lemley, supra note 10, at 1501. Approximately
85% of all patent cases settle before trial. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases
Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH.

U. L. REv. 237, 271 (2006).
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challengers and were incorrectly found to hold invalid patents by courts. 5 4
These valid patent holders do not simply pay litigation costs; they also lose all
future value from their patents. Thus, incorrect court decisions impose even
larger costs than correct court decisions from the perspective of valid patent
holders.
Why do we suspect that courts might mistakenly invalidate patents when the
popular sentiment in recent scholarship is to bemoan the patent system's lax
standards for patenting? 55 Many of the arguments for why courts may accidentally validate invalid patents are also arguments for why they might invalidate
valid patents. 56 For example, several scholars criticize the Federal Circuit,
which handles the bulk of appeals in patent litigation cases, for promulgating
weak standards for patentability.57 Others have noted the wide variation in
validation rates across industries," circuits," and, within jurisdictions, by
whether cases are tried to the bench or to a juryi6 This may reflect not just
randomness in litigation but also variation in underlying patentability standards.6 1 Most concerning may be that prior appellate reversals and job tenure do
not improve the performance of district courts judges in patent cases as measured by subsequent appellate reversals.6 2 Thus, judges do not appear to learn
how to better apply the law. Each of these flaws could translate to mistakes with
either invalid or valid patents.

54. If courts made no mistakes and patent challengers had perfect foresight, no holder of a valid
patent would ever be sued. We can reject this scenario, however, because it cannot explain why 55% of
patents are validated.
55. See supra note 10.

56. Another reason is that patent law's standards for judging whether innovations deserve patentsnovelty, nonobviousness, patentability-and the doctrines that complement them may not be the best
correlates of whether a patent is necessary to obtain an innovation and whether that innovation has
positive social value. See our caveat in note 7, supra.
57. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the "Written Description"
Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 55, 62-69

(2000) (criticizing the formulation of the written description requirement); David 0. Taylor, Clear But
Unconvincing: The Federal Circuit'sInvalidity Standard, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ETr. L.J.
293, 295-96 (2011); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
EmpiricalAssessment ofJudicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. Rav. 1105, 1111-12 (2004) (finding that

the Federal Circuit has been only mildly successful in promulgating a coherent and predictable doctrine
of claim construction).
58. Allison & Lemley, supra note 52, at 221-23 (finding variation in validation rates across
industries). Incidentally, litigation rates also vary by industry. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents,
92 GEO. L.J. 435, 477-78 (2003).
59. Allison & Lemley, supra note 52, at 192 (citing GLORIA K. KOENIG, PATENT INvALErTTY' A
STnSTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIs (rev. ed. 1980)).

60. Id. at 212 (finding that juries are more likely to validate patents).
61. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.

1155, 1185 (2002) (suggesting the non-obviousness standard might be stated in a manner that is harder
for software patents to meet than for biotech patents to meet).
62. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 258-59 (finding neither evidence that district court judges learn from
prior appeals of their rulings nor a significant relationship between judicial experience and performance). Of course, it is possible that appellate review in the Federal Circuit is effectively random.
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Whatever the cause, imposing the risk of litigation and mistaken invalidation
on valid patents reduces the fraction of social surplus that an inventor obtains
through a patent. This results in a weakening of the incentive the patent system
employs to get inventors to work on the most socially valuable patents.
2. Disproportionate Impacts on the Most Valuable Patents
One of the theoretical benefits of delegating patent challenges is that it
economizes on court resources. A challenger should not challenge a patent with
zero economic value because the market opened by the challenge is unlikely to
have value to the challenger and litigation has positive costs. Unless litigation
costs are positive but small, however, this economizing can go too far. If
litigation has high marginal costs or large fixed costs, patent challengers will
only go after patents that are sufficiently profitable to cover their litigation costs.
If it costs $10 million for a firm to pursue a patent challenge,6 then its profits
after successful litigation have to be at least $10 million to warrant the challenge. Because profits after the introduction of a competitor are lower than
profits under a monopoly, the patent holder (which had a monopoly) must lose
more than $10 million in payoff from the patent.
The problem is compounded if there are fewer competitors in a position to
challenge a patent holder than there are patents. In that case, the challengers, if
behaving optimally, will go after the most valuable patents, not just the patents
that-once invalidated-offer a payoff sufficient to cover the cost of litigation.
To illustrate, suppose that there are two patents that could be challenged, one
that provides $30 million in profits for its patent holder and the other that
provides $60 million in profits to its patent holder, but only one firm that has the
ability to challenge these two patents. Suppose also that market-wide profits
after entry of a competitor are two-thirds the previous profits of the patent
holder. This implies that successfully challenging the $30 million patent yields
revenue of $10 million6 5 for the challenger and challenging the $60 million
patent yields the challenger $20 million.6 If the challenger can only challenge
one of these patents, it will choose the higher valued patent. Thus the holder of
the higher value patent will face greater litigation risks than the holder of the
lower value patent.

63. But see Sawicki, supra note 38, at 766 (citing Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of
Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1251, 1251-52 (2004)) (noting that the disincentive effects of
mistaken invalidations depends on the efficacy of nonpatent mechanisms-such as trade secrets-that
inventors can use to appropriate the social surplus from their inventions).
64. This is not an atypical expenditure. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 52, at 187 (suggesting that
$1 million is a low estimate of litigation costs); see also Josh Lemer, Patenting in the Shadow of
Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 470-71 (1995) (reviewing evidence that, while $3.7 billion was
spent on basic research in 1991, $1 billion was spent on direct litigation costs, and that indirect costs of
patent litigation for public firms averaged $20 million per case).
65. 30 X (2/3) x (1/2) = 10. The one-half is because we assume that the two firms split any profits
equally.
66. 60 X (2/3) X (1/2) = 20.
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Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that challengers target the most
valuable patents. For example, generic-drug companies tend to infringe on
patents that protect markets with the highest sales revenues. 67 As a result,
blockbuster drugs have experienced significant reductions in their effective
patent life in recent years. 68 Whereas the median loss to a drug-patent holder
from a successful challenge is roughly $400 million, the average loss to such a
firm is roughly $1 billion in firm value. This indicates a strong rightward skew
in losses. We can think of no reason why patterns of litigation would differ in
other industries.70
The result is that delegating challenges to private parties not only reduces the
share of social surplus that patent holders appropriate from their innovation but
also reduces that share disproportionately for the highest value patents. In other
words, the nature of private challenges most strongly disincentivizes the most
valuable innovations, directly undermining the justification for employing the
patent system over one that employs government rewards.
3. Disproportionate Impacts on Smaller Firms
Challenges also disproportionately discourage innovations by smaller firms.
Commercially successful firms are not the only entities that obtain and hold
valuable patents, and thus they are not the only ones to become targets when
they innovate productively. Smaller firms-startup companies and the likealso frequently see their valuable patents attacked, and because the firms are
less equipped to defend themselves, the attacks can be all the more pernicious.
These assaults take two typical forms. First, rather than license or purchase
valuable IP from smaller entities, large firms often simply attempt to engineer
around it.71 For instance, imagine that Small Startup has designed a valuable
new semiconductor chip. It does not possess the necessary manufacturing
capability to actually produce the chip, but it hopes to license the technology to
a firm such as Intel. If Intel believes that Small Startup's patent is weak, or that

67. C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening,Patent Challenges, and Effective Market
Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH EcON. 327, 336 (2012); Laura E. Panattoni, The Effect of
ParagraphIV Decisions and Generic Entry Before Patent Expiration on Brand PharmaceuticalFirms,
30 J. HEALTH EcoN. 126 (2011).
68. Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity Periods in
Pharmaceuticals,28 MANAGERIAL DECISION EcON. 491, 497 (2007). Although Hemphill and Sampat,

supra note 67, at 3-4, claim this is because blockbuster drugs use lower quality patents to extend their
patent life (so-called "evergreening" strategies), their argument fails to explain why Grabowski and
Kyle find that the total market exclusivity period for higher-sale new-molecular entities (NME) is
lower, whether measured by mean or median, than that for lower sale NMEs.
69. Indeed, this value is larger than the average cost of R&D up to the point of market approval.
Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22
J. HEALTH EcON. 151, 154 fig.1 (2003).

70. Indeed, challenging a patent may be easier in the drug industry than in other industries because
the Hatch-Waxman Act gives the first generic firm to file an ANDA 180 days of market exclusivity
against other generic entry. See supra note 47.
71. John M. Golden, Principlesfor PatentRemedies, 88 TEx. L. REv. 505, 544 (2010).
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Small Startup will not have the resources to successfully prosecute a suit for
patent infringement, Intel could elect to engineer around the patent rather than
licensing it. It could simply begin manufacturing a similar technology with only
minor, cosmetic alterations, gambling that it will be able to convince a court
that it has not infringed. The more that firms like Small Startup fear this
outcome, the less incentive they will have to innovate and enter markets
occupied by large incumbents in the first place.
This is not to say that all instances of engineering around a patent are cases in
which the patent holder is not receiving a fair return on its invention; to the
contrary, many patent holders deserve only narrow patents that are relatively
easy to design around. However, there are many instances in which a small firm
has in fact introduced a new and useful innovation that a larger entity intends to
copy. In these cases, a poorly drafted patent, or simply the application of
significant litigation resources,7 2 can allow the larger firm to avoid paying for
the technology it is borrowing.
This possibility is exacerbated by the resource differential between the two
entities. If the fair market value for a startup's patent (or portfolio of patents) is
in the tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars, a larger firm might think
nothing of spending a few million dollars to defeat it or engineer around it.74 In
theory, the startup should be able to use its patent to obtain the capital necessary
to defend the patent. In practice, however, that is often impossible-capital
constraints can make a battle with a larger firm very difficult for a startup to
win.7 And if a large company can pay its engineers $3 million to find a way
around a patent it would otherwise license for $10 million, it will often do so.
The patent is still worth something-the large firm is paying millions to evade
it-but the startup is not capturing any of that value.
This is not to say that designing around a patent is always or necessarily a
bad thing. Ideally, patents would possess clear boundaries. A great deal of
scholarship has been devoted to the virtues of narrow patents that do not claim

72. Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 45 Hous. L. REv.

1201, 1227 (2008) ("Anticompetitive [P lawsuits may succeed because the small firm defendant lacks
the information to prove noninfringement or invalidity. Other defendants may settle to avoid litigation
costs even though they are confident the plaintiff would lose the lawsuit.").
73. Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?,23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063,

1086 (2008) ("The rational would-be infringer, when confronted with a patent held by an individual
inventor or a small company with limited resources, would likely be more willing to engage in
infringing behavior, calculating that the risk of enforcement is lower.").
74. See Golden, supra note 71, at 544 (describing the incentives to design around patents rather than
license them).
75. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between PatentProtection and Trade Secret Protection:
A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAr. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 371, 405 (2002) ("Additionally,

even if adequate funds exist to obtain patent protection sufficient capital must exist to enforce patent
rights against infringers. . . . This enables accused infringers to aggressively exploit the limited funds
available to a patent owner.").
76. Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing PatentBoundaries, 108 MICH. L. REv. 523, 560 (2010).
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excessively broad inventive scopes.77 The point is not that every patent holder
should be entitled to capture rents from a wide swath of following inventions.
Rather, we have in mind situations in which a firm is only trying to patent the
invention it has already created, but its patent leaves open the possibility that a
competitor will find some way to circumvent the intellectual property right. The
competitor is still borrowing the key idea-the "point of novelty"-7 -but has
managed to evade the patent. When large firms adopt this approach in lieu of
purchasing or licensing the patent, it diminishes the incentives for startups to
innovate in the first instance.
The second type of assault on small firms with valuable patents is more
direct. In many cases, larger firms will threaten to sue small startups with their
own (large) patent portfolios as a means of forcing the startup to license its IP
on favorable terms.7 Imagine two firms operating in the same market: a large
firm L and a small startup S. Suppose S invents and patents a new, valuable
device that will compete with L's products. If L has a large patent portfolio, it
can threaten to sue S for infringement even if S's new device would not actually
infringe L's patents. The very threat of suit-not to mention actual scorchedearth litigation-can be enough to hamper S's ability to attract investors and
bring its product to market; venture capitalists and banks will be wary of
investing in a firm with the threat of litigation hanging over its head.so Accordingly, L can force S to license its patent to L on favorable terms in exchange for
crosslicenses to L's patents (which S does not necessarily need). L then becomes
S's competitor, despite S's original patent. This practice has become known as
"patent bullying,""8 and it can diminish the value of innovations made by small
startups (to those startups) if they do not have the resources or the patent
portfolios to defend themselves.
These two practices-engineering around and patent bullying-bend the
reward curve downward for small firms that successfully innovate. And as with
the mechanisms we described in section II.A.2, the more valuable a firm's
innovation, the more pronounced this effect will be. More valuable inventions
are more valuable targets to competitors; larger firms will be willing to invest

77. See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope:
A New Perspective on the Doctrineof Equivalents, 93 GEo. L.J. 1947, 1955 (2005) (arguing that broad

patents may be used for anticompetitive behavior).
78. See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Point of Novelty, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1253, 1254 (2011).
79. See Graham & Sichelman, supra note 73, at 1068 (noting that "some companies use patents to
bully their competitors in order to drive up their costs, to gain access to their technology, or to push
them out of the market").
80. See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the
Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1587-88 (2009) ("The strategic use of patent

litigation by established companies to impose distress on their financially disadvantaged rivals has been
called patent predation. Such litigation can damage a defendant's credit rating, its relationship with
customers, and its reputation with investors, regardless of how the suit is ultimately resolved.").
81. See id. at 1588; Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting By Entrepreneurs: An
Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 111, 125-27 (2010) (explaining that "it may be

that incumbents can strategically exploit weak patents to prevent competition from potential entrants").
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greater resources in engineering around a valuable innovation or threatening the
startup that created it. Worse still, threats by large competitors will scare away
capital and commercial partners from small firms, depriving them of the resources they require to fight back on more equal terms. The result will be a
diminution of rewards to small firms for successful innovation below the
socially optimal level and, consequently, a reduction in these firms' innovative
efforts.
B. CHALLENGES AGAINST INVALID PATENTS

In some cases, challenges go too far, raising costs on valid patents and
discouraging innovation. In other cases, however, they do not go far enough: the
PTO grants an unnecessary or undeserved patent and a court nonetheless
upholds it. In such cases, an invalid patent continues to generate significant
economic costs without the compensating benefit of encouraging innovation.
The failure of private parties to challenge all invalid patents is not a direct cost
of challenges as much as it is a failure to fully accomplish the institutional
objective of challenges.
The reasons why patent challenges underperform mirror the reasons why they
sometimes go too far. Either private parties fail to challenge an invalid patent or
courts incorrectly uphold such patents when challenged. Moreover, the failure
of private parties can often be attributed to their inclination to challenge only
the most profitable patents, because they offer larger rewards if successful, or
the smallest patent holders, because they are most easily defeated in court. We
address these points in turn.
1. Insufficient Challenges and Validations
Just as private parties lack the complete information required to avoid
challenging valid patents, they also may lack the information required to
challenge all invalid patents. It is difficult, however, to quantify the extent to
which private parties fail to challenge invalid patents. In general, one only
observes challenges that are actually filed. Situations in which invalid patents
are not challenged are "censored" to scholars.
The second and more important source of leakage with challenges is that,
even if an invalid patent is challenged, a court might mistakenly validate it. As
previously noted, scholars have criticized the Federal Circuit for weak standards
of patentability, courts in general for varying degrees of fluency with patent
cases, and judges for failing to leam from experience. 82 The 55% overall
court-validation rate provides some information on the rate at which courts
mistakenly validate invalid patents. It is likely that this 55% contains at least
some truly valid patents; therefore, this is probably an upper bound on the rate
of incorrect validations by courts. In addition, challengers might settle cases

82. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
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rather than litigating them fully, depriving the public of the value of the patent
challenge. And here, too, there is likely a disproportionate impact on smaller
firms, which are more likely to lack the resources for scorched-earth litigation
and thus more likely to settle earlier.
When an invalid patent is never challenged--or, worse, when it is validated
by a court-it imposes several types of costs on consumers and other firms.
First, if the patent is protecting a commercial good, those goods will continue to
be sold at monopoly prices, creating deadweight losses for consumers who
cannot afford them." Second, when a court incorrectly finds that an invalid
patent is valid and infringed by another inventor, the second (true) inventor
must pay damages to the holder of the invalid patent. This functions as a tax on
genuine innovation, paid by true innovators to holders of invalid property
rights. The result will be a diminution of incentives to innovate on account of
this tax. And third, success with invalid patents will cause firms to invest money
in acquiring, asserting, and litigating those patents. They will hire lawyers,
demand licensing and settlement fees, and litigate at substantial cost.8 4 If the
patents underlying these activities are invalid and socially worthless, then
licensing and litigating them will generate no social value either-they represent pure rent seeking. The more that courts err and validate invalid patents, the
more that they will encourage wasting resources on these socially worthless
activities.
2. Disproportionate Impacts
The tendency of patent challenges to target the most profitable patents may
exacerbate the cost of challenges when an underlying patent is truly valid, but it
is a positive attribute of challenges when the underlying patent is truly invalid.
The most profitable patents are the ones that generate the most deadweight loss
because monopoly and oligopoly pricing models suggest that deadweight loss is
proportional to monopoly or oligopoly profits.85 If the underlying patent is
invalid, this larger deadweight loss is not offset by a larger incentive to
innovate, as it might be with valid patents. Thus, the tendency of challenges to
seek out the more profitable invalid patents implies that costly challenges are
being appropriately rationed to patents with the largest social cost.

83. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-AntitrustParadox, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 761,

768 (2002) (explaining the problem of monopolies in the context of patents).
84. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PRO. LAw Ass'N, REPORT OF THE EcoNoMIC SURVEY 22 (2003) (estimating

that patent litigation with between $1 million and $25 million at stake costs each side $2 million).
85. See TIROLE, supra note 21, at 56.
86. Again, we are operating under the assumption that legally valid patents are economically
valuable in the sense that they encourage innovation. Other scholars have challenged the value of
modem patent standards and thus this assumption. We do not dispute their claims. However, we have
nothing to add to them, and these claims do not undermine our claim that patent challenges are
problematic, even if legal standards of patentability are efficiency promoting. See supra note 7.
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The glass-half-empty view, however, is that the propensity to challenge more
profitable patents implies fewer challenges against less profitable patents. Yet
even less profitable invalid patents impose deadweight loss. It would improve
social welfare if there were more challenges and these challenges targeted the
less profitable patents, so long as the social costs from those invalid patents are
greater than the cost of litigation against those patents. It is unlikely that all such
challenges are occurring because the gains to a private party from challenging
such a patent may be less than the deadweight loss from that patent. If the
patent challenger wins, competitors other than the challenger may enter the
market, lowering profits of the challenger below the level of the deadweight
loss. It is this concern that explains why, for example, the Hatch-Waxman Act
grants the first generic producer to challenge a drug patent 180 days of market
exclusivity (as against other generic producers) if the generic producer prevails
in its challenge.
Finally, a corollary of the claim that challengers focus on the valid patents of
smaller firms is that challengers tend to avoid challenges against invalid patents
held by large firms. These large firms can credibly threaten large litigation costs
to discourage challengers and sustain invalid patents. Large firms can often
extract more rent from any given intellectual property right than smaller firms
because, for example, they have greater market share and more information
about consumers.

I.

ENHANCED PATENT REMEDIES

In the preceding Parts, we described the manner in which patent challenges
can result in what amount to taxes on valuable innovation or subsidies for the
assertion of invalid patents. In particular, these taxes often fall most heavily
upon the innovations that are most valuable and on smaller firms. We suggested
that the inevitable result of such taxes and subsidies will be to diminish
incentives to innovate for the most productive inventors and to encourage rent
extraction by noninnovative firms.
Here, we offer a counterintuitive solution to this problem: raise the stakes of
patent lawsuits. Patent holders who manage to prevail against challengers
should receive enhanced rewards-heightened damages or extensions of their
patent terms-and patent holders who lose at trial should be penalized for suing
on the basis of invalid patents. This approach might seem misguided on its face.
If courts are liable to err in patent lawsuits, the more appropriate response
would seem to be to reduce the impact of those lawsuits. Scholars have
suggested such reforms, 8 and in recent years courts appear to have taken steps

87. 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(B) (2006).
88. See, e.g., Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MIcH. L. REV.
175, 202 (2011) (suggesting that the doctrine of accession, which transfers ownership of property to an
individual who increases its value and compensates the prior owner, be applied to patent law to limit
injunctive relief and the amount of damages available); Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells,
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in this direction."
Yet as we will demonstrate below, increasing the stakes of patent litigation
can have tremendously beneficial effects on private firms' incentives. Firms
with valid, valuable patents will realize greater profits on those patents, providing them with additional incentives to innovate and correcting for the costs
imposed by improper patent challenges. Firms with invalid patents will face
steep penalties if they lose at trial. Those penalties will in turn dissuade them
from filing suit in the first place and diminish their ability to extract licensing
and settlement fees. The result will be a patent system that comes closer to
rewarding genuine innovators but not the holders of socially worthless property
rights.
A. CANONICAL SOLUTIONS

The problems we have described in the preceding Parts all center around
judicial error.90 In the face of such problems, commentators have typically
suggested the most straightforward solution: invest in accuracy. Proposals for
making courts more accurate abound.91 However, there are well-documented
practical and theoretical impediments to this solution. Courts, particularly courts
staffed by generalist judges, will always struggle with highly technical patent
cases. 9 2 The judicial process and the limitations it imposes upon gathering
outside information and accessing expertise will also impede judicial accuracy.9 3 This is not to say that there is no value to investing in greater judicial

and Other Market Failures:A Casefor a Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property,

48 How. L.J. 579, 584 (2005) (suggesting "a limited compulsory licensing scheme"); Ranganath
Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value PatentSuits: An Economic Model and Proposal,25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER

& HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 177 (2009) (exploring the possibility of damage caps in patent law).
89. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (adopting a conservative
approach to granting permanent injunctions against parties found to be infringing a patent); Therasense,
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (establishing a higher,
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for invoking the defense of inequitable conduct, which, if
established, invalidates the entire patent).
90. For a nice review of the relationship between court errors and optimal tort rules, see Giuseppe
Dari-Mattiacci, Errorsand the Functioning of Tort Liability, 13 Sup. CT. EcON. REV. 165, 167 (2005).
An important distinction between Dari-Mattiaci's analysis and ours is that the former examines, in the
tort context, how court errors in determining due care and the magnitude of damages-and the
relationship between the two-affect precautions, whereas we examine how errors in determining
patent validity (liability) can be overcome by intentionally multiplying damages.
91. See e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit
Comes ofAge, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 804 (2008) ("Another idea would be to abolish the Federal

Circuit and reconstitute it as a trial court."); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A MultiInstitutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1035, 1102 (2003) ("I discuss

whether the best solution would involve abolishing the Federal Circuit, and having a system of
specialized trial courts reviewed by generalist appellate courts.").
92. Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SuP. CT. REv. 275, 307-09 (2011) (discussing the
relevant level of expertise among federal judges with patent law); see also Peter Lee, Patent Law and
the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 20-25 (2010) (describing courts' view of their own institutional
role).
93. See Masur,supra note 92, at 310-11 (discussing the procedural limitations of courts).
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accuracy; such investments may well be worthwhile. But they are no panacea.
If there are limits to judicial accuracy, perhaps the government could instead
invest in accuracy at the Patent and Trademark Office. The patent literature is
rife with calls for improving accuracy at the PTO and suggestions for achieving
that goal. 9 4 However, even if this were possible, it would not eliminate the costs
involved with patent challenges. Holders of valuable, valid patents might still
bear costs as those patents were challenged in court. The necessary second step
would be to eliminate postgrant validity challenges entirely, whether in federal
court, before the PTO, or elsewhere. Once a patent had been issued by the PTO,
it would be considered per se valid and not subject to question in any future
proceeding. The elimination of postgrant challenges could be coupled with
enhanced review at the PTO, with additional resources devoted to screening out
invalid patents before they were ever issued. In theory, then, the costs of patent
challenges would be borne most heavily by parties with questionable or invalid
patents, not successful innovators.
Yet there are serious problems with this option. The first is that the examination performed by the PTO may never be terribly efficient or effective at
weeding out bad patents because PTO examiners have misaligned incentives.
As we explained above, they have no incentive to conduct thorough searches of
prior art and, even if they did, they would still have greater incentives to grant,
rather than reject, patent applications. 6 Moreover, even if it were possible to
correct these incentive problems, it would be tremendously costly to conduct a
thorough search of the prior art on each and every patent filed each year.
There are simply too many patent applications, and too many of them are
economically insignificant and will never be litigated or licensed. 9 8 As inefficient as patent challenges may be, conducting a full-scale examination of every
patent would be even worse. Lastly, in many cases the owners of valuable
patents are frustrated not by rulings that their patents are invalid, but instead by
rulings that they are not infringed by important competitors.9 9 Banning challenges to a patent's validity could hardly solve this problem, and there is no

94. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality
One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729 (2006); Shubha
Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office,

40 Hous. L. REv. 1219 (2004). There have been legislative attempts as well. See, e.g., America Invents
Act, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (creating several mechanisms for post-grant review and reexamination).
95. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 7, at 136 (describing the incentives facing patent examiners); cf.

John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 522, 540-41 (2007) (noting that
judges' preferences for leisure time will incline them to grant more motions for summary judgment than
would otherwise be appropriate). One study found that patent approval rates spike in September-the
month in which the PTO's accounting year closes and examiners are awarded bonuses for processed
applications. Gajan Retnasaba, Why It Is Easier To Get a Patent in September (May 23, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-id= 1121132.
96. See supra section I.B.
97. Lemley, supra note 10, at 1495-96 & n.1.
98. Id.
99. See supra Part I.
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correlative solution to the problems caused by noninfringement. Most importantly, if the patent system is generally functioning correctly, it makes little
sense to entirely prohibit a set of challenges which will be welfare enhancing
more often than not. Such a remedy is overbroad.
A more moderate alternative would be to imbue patents that have been
granted by the PTO with a heavy presumption of validity, diminishing the
number of incorrect invalidity determinations in the federal courts. Patents are
currently presumed valid when granted, and clear-and-convincing evidence is
required before they can be found invalid.'s This presumption might be
strengthened further, to the point where (for instance) a patent could only be
invalidated if no reasonable person could find it valid. Some scholars have
suggested that the law should move in the opposite direction, toward eliminating the presumption of validity on the basis of the PTO's manifest failings in
patent examination, 01 but change now appears very unlikely as the Supreme
Court recently affirmed the existing standard. 10 2 Heightening the standard for
invalidity would have many of the same advantages and flaws as simply
eliminating challenges entirely, though those effects would be more muted.
Absent any reason to believe that such an intermediate solution would decrease
the costs of eliminating validity challenges more than it would the benefits, it
strikes us as no more advisable than a complete ban.
B.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: ENHANCED REWARDS AND PENALTIES

The issue that we have identified is partly the result of erroneous decisions to
challenge or not to challenge a patent as well as erroneous judicial decisions to
uphold an invalid patent or strike down a valid patent. If we cannot easily
reduce the probability that a valuable patent will be erroneously defeated at
trial, the second-best alternative might be to increase the rewards to holders of
valuable patents who prevail at trial. So long as courts are more likely than not
to uphold a valid patent, the effect would be the same: to increase the valid
patent holder's net expected trial outcome. Similarly, if we cannot easily reduce
the probability that an invalid patent will be erroneously validated at trial, the
second-best alternative might be to impose additional penalties against the
holders of patents who fail at trial. So long as courts are more likely than not to
strike down an invalid patent, this would reduce the invalid patent holder's net
expected trial outcome.
We thus suggest raising the stakes in patent cases. Our basic idea is simple. If
a patent holder sues and wins, the court should award enhanced damages above
and beyond the normal measure of damages. If a patent holder sues and loses,
the court should assess a substantial monetary penalty against the patent holder.

100. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) ("A patent shall be presumed valid."); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct.
2238, 2245-47 (2011).
101. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 10.
102. Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2243, 2252.
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This may seem counterintuitive-if patent lawsuits are not perfectly accurate, it
would seem to make little sense to increase the costs involved in errors. Yet so
long as courts are better than a coin flip at identifying a patent as valid or
invalid, a system of properly designed, supplemental rewards and penalties
could simultaneously (1) eliminate the downward pressure on innovative incentives caused by errors within the patent system; and (2) dissuade holders of bad
patents from filing suit in the first instance. Most importantly, such a system
would tend to benefit holders of valid, valuable patents and diminish incentives
to acquire and assert invalid patents.
How would such a system function? Our idea is to apply standard theories of
compensation drawn from tort law."o' Consider first holders of valid, valuable
patents. The purpose behind enhanced rewards is to compensate those owners
for the risk that their patents will be improperly invalidated and thus counteract
the downward bending of the reward curve for the most valuable inventions.
What is the cost of that risk? Suppose that a typical valid, valuable patent has a
probability p of being erroneously invalidated (or erroneously found not infringed) in litigation. Suppose further that litigation imposes a fixed cost of c on
the patent holder. The cost of litigation to a patent holder is c + pvy, where v is
the value of the patent (to its owner) per year and y is the number of useful
years of patent life lost to the patent owner." The pvy term represents the risk
of early invalidation. 0 5
The calculation for losing patent owners is quite similar. Suppose that the
owner of an invalid patent sues a genuine innovator for infringement. Suppose
the probability that the court errs and upholds an invalid patent is p, the same as
the probability that the court strikes down a valid patent.' 0 6 The accused
infringer will bear litigation costs of c. It will also face expected damages of

103. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 167-211 (7th ed. 2007) (describing

standard economic theories of tort law).
104. In the interest of simplicity, the model inthe text assumes that a patent has constant value over
time and does not include discounting. A more general formulation of the costs of litigation to the
patent holder is c + pV where V is the net present value of the patent over the period during which the
patent was infringed but calculated as of the date the suit was resolved in favor of the patent holder. In
later sections, we relax some of these simplifying assumptions.
105. These years of patent life would include both the years remaining on the patent term-if the
patent is valuable over those years-and any earlier years during which the patent was infringed. That
is, suppose Generic Firm B begins infringing Pharmaceutical Firm A's patent eleven years into that
patent's twenty-year life. Firm A sues Firm B for infringement, and seven years later (in the eighteenth
year of the patent term) prevails before a jury. Firm A would be entitled to supplemental damages based
on nine years of patent life. Those nine years represent the period of valuable patent life that was
effectively at risk during the lawsuit.
106. It would be easy to generalize and assume the probability of upholding an invalid patent is q +
p. On the assumption that current rules of patentability are correct, we have no reason to suspect one
type of error is more likely than the other. Some scholars assert that patent law has too low standards of
patentability. See supra note 7. This would suggest a greater likelihood of upholding an invalid patent.
Because the thesis of this paper-using enhanced penalties to address flaws in patent challenges-does
not depend on the specific underlying rates of error, we proceed under the assumption that error
probabilities are symmetric, i.e., p = q, in order to simplify our exposition.
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pvy. The potential cost to the innovator is therefore c + pvy. As in tort law, the
way to deter the holder of an invalid patent from imposing such costs on
blameless innovators is to force the losing patent owner to internalize the costs
of her own lawsuit, namely c + pvy.
A problem that arises is that, just as a court cannot perfectly identify whether
a patent is valid or invalid, it cannot perfectly identify which parties deserve
compensation for exposure to litigation and which should be penalized for
imposing litigation risks. All courts know is whether they upheld or struck
down a patent. Therefore, any compensation or penalties imposed after patent
litigation must be conditioned on verdicts. In doing so, the court must account
for the possibility that a patent that is upheld may not be valid and a patent that
is struck down may not be invalid. This implies that the optimal compensation
for a patent that has been upheld is:
Pr{ Valid| Upheld) X (Enhanced remedy for valid patent)
}X (Penaltyfor invalid patent)
+ Pr{InvalidlUpheld)
where Pr{ Validl Upheld} is the probability that a patent is valid given that it was
upheld by the court, and Pr{InvalidlUpheld} is the probability that a patent is
actually invalid even though it was upheld by the court. That is, the additional
compensation provided to a winning patent holder must be reduced to account
for the probability that the court erred and the patent was not actually valid.
Similarly, the optimal penalty for a patent that has been struck down at trial is:
Pr(ValidlStruck down} X (Enhanced remedy for valid patient)
+ Pr{Invalid|Struckdown) X (Penaltyfor invalid patent)
where Pr{ Valid|Struck down) is the probability that a patent is actually valid
even though it was struck down by the court, and Pr{Invalid|Struckdown) is
the probability that a patent is invalid given that it was struck down by the
court. As with enhanced rewards, because judicial verdicts are imperfect, the
penalty must be reduced to account for the possibility that the court erred in
striking it down.
To calculate the optimal transfers and penalties, we need to estimate how
informative court judgments are. To do this, we can use Bayes's Theorem:
Pr{UpheldlValid) X Pr{Valid)
(Pr{Upheld|Valid} X Pr{Valid) +
Pr{UpheldjlInvalid) X Pr{Invalid})
where Pr{ Upheldl Valid) is the probability that a patent will be upheld given
that it is valid, which is equal to 1 - p; Pr{ UpheldlInvalid} is the probability
that a patent will be upheld given that it is invalid; and Pr{ Valid} and Pr{Invalid)
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are the probabilities that a patent selected at random will be valid or invalid,
respectively. If we assume that Pr{ Valid} = Pr{Invalid},or then Bayes's Rule
suggests that Pr{ Valid|Uphheld) simplifies to (1 - p)/(1 - p + p) = 1 - p.
Because a patent must either be valid or invalid, this also implies that
Pr{Invalid|Upheld) = p. Using the same approach, we can estimate the probabilities that a patent is valid or invalid if it is struck down. By Bayes's Rule,
Pr{Struck down|Invalid} X Pr{Invalid)
(Pr{Struck down Invalid} X Pr(Invalid}
+ Pr{Struck down Valid} X Pr{Valid})
where Pr{Struck downjInvalid} is the probability that a patent will be struck
down given that it is invalid, which is equal to 1 - p; Pr{ Struck down|Valid} is
the probability that a patent will be struck down given that it is valid, which is
equal to p; and Pr(Valid} and Pr(Invalid} are the probabilities that a patent
selected at random will be valid or invalid, respectively. As before, if we
assume that Pr{Valid} = Pr{Invalid}, Pr{Invalid|Struck down } simplifies to
(1 - p)/(1 - p + p) = 1 - p. Again by negative implication, Pr { Valid|Struck
down) = p.
If we plug these values into the equations for optimal compensation, we will
find that the optimal reward for a patent upheld at trial is
(1 - p)(c + pvy) + p(-c - pvy) = (1 - 2p)(c + pvy).
Likewise, the optimal penalty for a patent struck down at trial is
p(c + pvy) + (1 - p)(-c -pvy)= -(1

- 2p)(c + pvy).

The (1 - 2p) discount reflects the lack of confidence that court verdicts identify
truly valid and invalid patents.
In order for this system of enhanced rewards and penalties to have the desired
incentive effects, patent holders and challengers must of course have some
sense of whether the patent at issue is valid and infringed. If the parties are
entirely mistaken as to the validity of the patent, enhanced rewards and penalties will only skew their behavior even further. However, as we will demonstrate at the end of this section, little accuracy is actually required of patent
holders and challengers. So long as litigants are better than a coin flip at
determining what sort of patent is involved, the system of enhanced rewards and
penalties will improve litigation incentives.
107. This is equivalent to assuming that 50% of patents asserted in litigation are invalid or not
infringed. This may overstate the true percentage of asserted patents that are valid and infringed. See
supra note 52. Regardless, we set Pr{ Valid) = Pr{ Invalid) only to simplify the mathematics here. The
formula will generate correct answers so long as the true values are plugged in.
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In order to illustrate the effects of these enhanced rewards and penalties,
consider a simple numerical example. Suppose that the typical patent litigation
costs $10 million, and the error rate in the typical case is 20%. (It will, of
course, be impossible to determine the error rate in a particular case-doing so
would be tantamount to determining the outcome with perfect certainty. Courts
will necessarily rely instead upon the typical error rate across cases.) 08 Suppose further that pharmaceutical Firm A holds a patent that is worth $10 million
per year and has seven years of patent life remaining. That patent is being
infringed by generic drug Firm B. Firm A stands to collect $70 million (the
value of damages and an injunction) from Firm B if it prevails at trial.' 0 9 Under
current rules, if Firm A were to prevail, its gain would be:
$70 million in damages - $10 million in litigation costs = $60 million.
If Firm A were defeated, it would pay:
$10 million in litigation costs.
Under our proposed system of enhanced rewards and benefits, if Firm A
prevailed, it would collect:
$70 million in damages - $10 million in litigation costs + ($10 million
+ $70 million X 0.2) X (1 - 0.4) in enhanced rewards = $74.4 million.

If Firm A lost at trial, it would be forced to pay:
$10 million in litigation costs + ($10 million + $70 million X 0.2)
x (1 - 0.4) in penalties = $24.4 million.

Now consider the effects that these enhanced rewards and penalties will have
upon litigant behavior. Imagine that Firm A has a valid, valuable patent, one
based upon legitimate research and covering a socially valuable invention.
Suppose that Firm A has a 75% chance of prevailing against Firm B at trial.
Under current law, Firm A's expected payoff from litigating is:

108. We discuss in detail below the issues of how this error rate might be calculated and what actor
or institution might be best equipped and positioned to calculate it.
109. It will not necessarily always be the case that the value of the patent to its owner is equivalent
to the damages that will be assessed against the defendant in the event that the patent owner prevails at
trial. It will depend upon a number of factors, including the effect that the entrance of the infringer into
the market will have on the patent holder's supercompetitive profits. Yet the exact numbers are
irrelevant. The system of enhanced rewards and penalties we describe will function similarly irrespective of the precise numerical values involved. We employ similar numbers here only to simplify the
mathematics.
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($60 million net X 0.75) - ($10 million X 0.25) = $42.5 million.

With enhanced rewards and penalties, Firm A's expected payoff is:
($74.4 million net x 0.75) - ($24.4 million X 0.25) = $49.7 million.

As is evident from the calculations above, the enhanced rewards that Firm A
receives when it succeeds at trial more than balance out the penalties it would
be forced to pay if it fails. This is because Firm A has a strong patent, one that is
more likely than not to be found valid and infringed. The result is that Firm A
will be almost fully compensated for the risk it runs that its patent will be found
invalid each time it is forced to litigate. Firm A's reward curve will be bent back
upward, and its incentives to pursue the most socially valuable inventions will
be restored.
Suppose that Firm A instead owns a worthless, invalid patent, one that it
should not be asserting against genuine innovators. Nonetheless, because of the
possibility of judicial error, there is a 20% chance that Firm A's patent will be
found valid and infringed at trial. Under current law, Firm A's expected payoff
from litigating is:
($60 million net X 0.2) - ($10 million X 0.8) = $4 million.

With enhanced rewards and penalties, Firm A's expected payoff from litigating
is:
($74.4 million X 0.2) - ($24.4 million X 0.8) = -$4.64

million.

The addition of enhanced rewards and penalties thus transforms Firm A's
decision to litigate this weak patent from a reasonable gamble with a positive
payoff into a losing proposition. "o This will have feedback effects on Firm A's
other uses of the patent. Firm A will not be able to extract substantial concessions during licensing negotiations or settlement if it stands to lose money by
proceeding to trial. This is exactly as it should be: we are better off if this patent
is never so much as mentioned in a threatening letter, much less asserted at trial.
The analytic discussion that began this section set forth the optimal measure
of enhanced rewards and penalties, and the numerical example that followed
was just one example. But it is crucial to note that enhanced rewards and
penalties will improve trial outcomes for owners of valuable patents and harm
110. If the probability of error is larger, for example, p = 0.25, then it is possible that a patent holder
should receive a reward even if its patent is struck down. The reason is that the ideal reward for a valid
patent holder is much larger than the ideal penalty on an invalid patent holder. Even a slight increase in
the error rate increases the probability that a verdict striking down a patent is ensnaring a valid patent
holder and thus increases the proper transfer, perhaps making it net positive.
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trial outcomes for owners of invalid patents any time that courts and litigants
are more accurate than flipping coins. That is, if courts reach the right outcome
at trial more than 50% of the time, and litigants know whether they have a valid
or invalid patent with at least 50% accuracy, and the enhanced reward or
penalty is greater than zero, then the system we describe will benefit holders of
valid patents and harm holders of invalid ones. 1 It is not necessary that private
parties have any informational advantages over courts (though it would be
helpful). Nor is it necessary that the two parties have asymmetric (or symmetric) beliefs or information. The mechanism of enhanced rewards and penalties
will function properly so long as each actor is more accurate than a coin flip. It
is thus robust to an extremely wide range of parameters.
To illustrate this point, consider the following extreme numerical example.
Suppose courts are 51% accurate at determining whether a patent is valid or
invalid; parties are similarly 51% accurate at determining the validity of the
patent at suit; and enhanced rewards and penalties are set at $1,000. The holder
of a valid patent will likely receive an enhanced trial award of:
$1000 X 0.51 - $1000 X 0.49 = $20.

The holder of an invalid patent will likely be assessed a penalty of:
$1000 x 0.51 - $1000 x 0.49 = $20.
Suppose that a patent owner owns a valid and valuable patent but only knows
this with 51% probability. The patent owner will anticipate an enhanced payoff
of:
$20 x 0.51 - $20 x 0.49 = $0.40.

In symmetric fashion, an owner of an invalid patent would anticipate an
enhanced penalty of -$0.40. The high degree of inaccuracy depresses the
impact of the enhanced rewards and penalties. But the principle nonetheless
holds: firms with valuable patents will be compensated in part for their litigation
risk, whereas firms with valueless patents will be punished for threatening suit.
By consequence, firms with valid, valuable patents will be even more likely
to file suit; firms with invalid, socially worthless patents will be less likely to
file suit or assert those patents against genuine innovators. Most importantly,
this mechanism will function without any gains in accuracy by the courts or the
PTO. Private parties will adjust simply as a matter of their own incentives and
11. If courts are less than 50% accurate-that is, worse than a coin flip-then it makes no sense to
have courts deciding patent cases in the first place. If the courts cannot be improved, we would be better
off abolishing them and flipping coins. We cannot prove that courts are better than a coin flip, but we
suspect (or at least hope) that this is the case.
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their perceived likelihood of success. The result will be fewer lawsuits based
upon invalid patents and greater rewards for owners of valid, valuable intellectual property rights.
C. WHO PAYS WHOM?

The discussion thus far has been directed toward properly setting the patent
holder's incentives. The goal is to reward holders of valuable patents in order to
incentivize further research and development, while simultaneously dissuading
owners of worthless patents from filing suit. We have not yet addressed the
questions of who should pay for patent owners' enhanced rewards and who
should be paid when patent owners are assessed enhanced penalties. We take up
those questions in this section, and again we reach a counterintuitive conclusion: the structure of payments should not be symmetric. Successful patent
challengers should be paid by the patent holders who litigated against them; but
victorious patent holders should be paid by the public, rather than the patent
challenger who has been found to infringe. This is contrary to the norm in
American civil litigation that, aside from the costs of litigation, damages paid
by the defendant are equal to the damages received by the plaintiff.' 1 2
1. Victorious Patent Owner
When a patent owner in possession of a valuable property right prevails at
trial, it would seem obvious at first blush that the patent challenger should be
forced to pay for the enhanced rewards. After all, it is the challenger who has
created the costs in the first instance. However, this might inhibit valuable
challenges to bad patents as well-a losing infringer could face substantial
liability under this rule. Challengers to bad patents are providing public goods:
if they invalidate a socially harmful property right, a broad spectrum of innovators will reap the benefits."' 3 When a court invalidates a patent, it benefits the
consumers of the underlying product as well as all competing firms that might
wish to enter the relevant market-not just the firm that prevailed in the
lawsuit.114 As a result, a patent challenger only internalizes a small fraction of
the benefits of a successful suit. There will be many instances in which it would
be socially productive if a patent were challenged but not privately worthwhile

112. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution,73

CALIF.

L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1985). Criminal penalties are an exception. Defendants pay fines to the state rather than
to the victim of their crimes. See, e.g., Andrew M. Kenefick, Note, The Constitutionalityof Punitive
Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MiCH. L. REv. 1699, 1704

(1987).
113. Public goods are goods that are nonrival: no one can be excluded from using or enjoying them.
The invalidation of a bad patent creates a public good because any competitor to the patent holder, not
just the party that invalidated the patent, can now enter the market. For a general discussion of public
goods, see HARVEY S. ROSEN, PusLic FINANCE 61 (5th ed. 1999).
114. See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating
Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 688 (2004) ("A court judgment that a patent claim is invalid is a

public good.").
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for any individual firm, and the challenge will not take place.115 For instance,
suppose that a semiconductor manufacturer holds a patent on a valuable computer chip. The patent, however, is plausibly invalid-the chip is too similar to
one that preceded it. It would be socially productive if another semiconductor
firm were to challenge the patent and attempt to invalidate it because the price
of the chip would fall if the challenge were successful. However, it might not be
worthwhile for another manufacturer to do so. That firm would bear the full cost
of the challenge, including the damages it would have to pay if it were found to
be infringing-but it would capture only a fraction of the value of invalidating
the patent. The original manufacturer would still control part of the market, and
other semiconductor firms that did not participate in the lawsuit could swoop in
and capture market share as well. The challenger would be providing a benefit
to other parties. This is likely why there are too few patent challenges over all.
It makes little sense to impose additional taxes on patent challengers and
potentially further dissuade them from producing such public goods.
Another possibility is paying for the additional rewards out of general tax
revenues. The government could provide a direct monetary award as part of the
remedies phase of litigation. This would avoid distortions in the behavior of
potential patent challengers. However, we think a superior solution would be for
future consumers of the innovative firm's products to pay for these rewards. The
reason is fairness-or, at least, distributional neutrality. The reason for creating
supplemental rewards is to eliminate the disincentive for future innovation
imposed by nonmeritorious litigation. The beneficiaries of this future innovation
are the future consumers of the firm's products. Thus, it is more fair-and there
is less needless redistribution of wealth-if future consumers pay for these
supplemental rewards.
The more difficult question is how to identify and collect from these future
consumers. It is, of course, impossible to know precisely who will purchase a
firm's products in the future. But the firm's current consumers (or those people
who will be purchasers in the near future) might serve as a reasonable proxy.
Individuals who are purchasing Apple products today are probably most likely
to purchase them in the future; individuals (or businesses) who buy one Dell
computer are more likely to purchase another Dell computer; and so forth.1'6
The government could conceivably impose a special tax on current or future
purchases of a firm's products, with that tax being paid directly to the firm-but
this would be counterproductive. It would amount to a state-imposed price hike
on a firm's goods, which would presumably decrease the quantities of those

115. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of UnenforcedInvalid Patents,91 MINN.
L. REv. 101, 114 (2006) ("[E]ven invalid patents can create unacceptable litigation risks for potential
entrants, raise entry costs, delay entry, deter customers and business partners from contracting with new
entrants, and impose inefficiencies while distorting innovation.").
116. Cf Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual

Property, 88 VA. L. REv. 1455, 1462-63 (2002) (arguing that patents and trademarks can be used to
increase the power of brand loyalty and its profitability).
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goods sold. It is safe to assume that each firm is pricing its own goods so as to
maximize profits-or, at least, that the firm is better at doing so than the
government would be.' 17 Most firms would simply lower their prices, returning
the overall price of the product to its prior level. A separate tax, even one paid
directly to the firm, would not be an improvement.
A better solution is to extend the terms of the patents at suit.1 18 Consider a
change in the law that allowed courts to award additional years at the end of a
patent term any time a patent holder won a lawsuit for infringement of that
patent. The firm would garner further monopoly profits from this extended term,
providing additional rewards for its innovation. These rewards would be paid
for by consumers who purchase that firm's products in the near future-again, a
reasonable proxy for those consumers who will purchase future products made
by the same firm.11
It would not be difficult for a court (or Congress) to properly price the size of
this supplemental reward. Recall that the supplemental reward should equal
(c + pvy)/(1 - 2p). The pvy term represents the potential loss of patent term
length if that patent is improperly invalidated at trial. If the value of a patent
over its lifespan is approximately constant, a court should just extend a patent's
term by (c/v + py)(1 - 2p)-the ratio of transaction costs to the annual value of
the patent, plus the number of valuable years of the patent term put at risk at
trial discounted by the probability that the patent could have been mistakenly
invalidated. If litigation costs are small relative to annual profits from a patentthat is, if c << v-one could ignore the c/v term.1 2 0 This would eliminate any
need to calculate precisely the average yearly value of the patent, which a court
would have to undertake if it were awarding supplemental monetary damages.
That it is the patent itself that is being extended renders this accounting
unnecessary. Imagine, for instance, that a patent holder wins an infringement
lawsuit based on conduct that began fourteen years after the patent at suit was
granted. Six years remain on the patent term. Suppose that the court estimates
that the error rate in such cases involving valid patents is 20%. 121 In addition to
the usual remedies, the court would extend the patent's term by an additional

117. See, e.g., Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4

Am. L. & EcoN. REV. 168, 179 (2002) (explaining that the common effects of price controls are
"queuing, unsatisfied demand, and an illegal market").
118. A patent is valid for twenty years from the date the patent application was first filed. 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(2) (2006).
119. Of course, if the victorious patent holder is not a commercial firm but instead a non-practicing
entity that makes profits through patent royalties, it would be the losing firm's customers, rather than
the winning firm's customers, who would foot the bill. If the patent was truly novel and innovative and
was effectively expropriated by the defendant, this arrangement would be appropriate. But if the patent
is not novel and valuable, it presents a problem. Section IV offers a brief sketch of a solution.
120. For evidence that suggests litigation costs are often substantially lower than annual profits, see
supra note 64 and accompanying text.
121. It may be overoptimistic to think that a court could properly estimate the probability of its own
(or the jury's) error. Accordingly, it would probably be best if Congress set this probability by
legislation.
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0.84 years, or approximately 10 months.12 2 There could also be a small additional
adjustment (clv) for the fixed cost c of the patent litigation even if c <<
3
V.

12

The potential downside of extending the patent term-as opposed to simply
paying the patentee from general tax revenues-is that it could lead to increased
deadweight economic losses. As we explained above, the virtue of a patent is
that it provides the patentee with a limited monopoly over a good, allowing the
patentee to charge monopolistic prices (rather than competitive prices). These
higher prices incentivize further research and innovation, but they are also
conventionally thought to price some consumers out of the market. When a
consumer who would have purchased the good at a competitive price cannot
afford it at monopoly price, there is a resulting deadweight loss in the form of
diminished consumer welfare.124
This is an important consideration, though it may well be outweighed by the
other advantages of extending the patent term. The main case for a twenty-year
patent is that the innovative effects from exclusivity of that duration exceeds the
deadweight loss from that exclusivity. That argument is typically made while
ignoring the litigation costs from patent challenges and assuming no court errors
when challenges are litigated. Our patent extension and penalties are designed
to return the period of exclusivity to the balance that would be achieved under a
twenty-year patent without challenges. Moreover, it is possible that the conventional belief that patents lead to monopoly prices and deadweight losses is
overstated. In separate work, we have argued that creative-pricing mechanisms
can eliminate the deadweight loss associated with patents by ensuring that no
(or very few) consumers are priced out of the market for patented goods.1 2 5 We
further demonstrate that these pricing mechanisms are in use across a broad
spectrum of industries.12 6 If we are correct, the case against patent term
extensions dissipates substantially.
A second concern with our approach is that it relies upon a questionable
assumption: that the value of a patent is approximately constant over time. If a
patent declines in value over time, additional years after the end of the typical
patent term will be insufficient to compensate the patent holder for the risk of

122. (20 year patent term - 14 years elapsed) X 0.2 X (1-0.4) = 0.84 years = 10.08 months.

123. Calculation of this additional adjustment will necessarily be more crude, as the variance in
patent values-and thus the variance in the value of additional term length-far exceeds the variance in
the cost of patent litigation. Some victorious patent holders inevitably will be paid too much; some will
be paid too little. However, in many cases, and for many valuable patents-the ones that will be
litigated most frequently-c will be much smaller than v. Accordingly, it will be unnecessary to
calculate this additional quantity.
124. See Alan J. Meese, Debunking the PurchaserWelfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act:
How HarvardBrought Us a Total Welfare Standardand Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 659,
662 (2010).
125. See Anup Malani & Jonathan Masur, Two-Part Pricing and the Cost of Patents (2012)

(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
126. Id.
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losing earlier years before the end of the patent's life. In the limiting case, a
patent may even be worthless by the end of its life. This assumption of constant
patent value is fairly conservative for pharmaceuticals and for many types of
medical devices, which sell for a higher price and at higher quantities at the end
of their life than they do at the beginning 2 7 due to advertising.12 8 But it does
not hold true for most semiconductor and computer patents, which are generally
valueless after four or five years as they are outpaced by advances in technology.129 Accordingly, in designing supplemental remedies it might be necessary
to draw distinctions among industries. Owners of pharmaceutical patents would
receive an additional patent-term length, while owners of computer-related
patents would receive direct monetary payments from the government. We do
not pause to dwell on the specifics of this proposal here but instead explore the
idea of industry-specific treatment in greater detail in Part IV. In addition, in that
Part we suggest modifications to the proposal for supplemental remedies that
may obviate the particular issue of whether to grant additional term length or
supplemental money damages.
2. Victorious Patent Challenger
As we explained above, there will generally be too few patent challenges
because patent challengers cannot fully internalize the benefits of their success.
In order to incentivize greater numbers of patent challenges, it makes sense to
offer additional rewards or bounties to patent challengers who succeed in court.
Accordingly, when a patent challenger prevails and forces a patent owner to pay
heightened penalties, those penalties should be paid to the patent challenger.
The Hatch-Waxman Act accomplishes this in the context of pharmaceutical
patents by offering successful patent challengers 180 days of market exclusivity.13 0 In effect, we are suggesting a Hatch-Waxman-type rule for every type of
patent.
In addition to the positive incentive effects, forcing defeated patent owners to
pay enhanced penalties to victorious challengers would have valuable distributional effects. When a patent owner asserts an invalid patent, it is the competitorthe patent challenger-who stands to be harmed most directly. The invalid

127. Jayanta Bhattacharya & William B. Vogt, A Simple Model of PharmaceuticalPrice Dynamics,
46 J.L. & EcON. 599, 599 (2003); Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Generic Entry and the
Pricing of Pharmaceuticals,6 J. EcON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 75, 82-83 (1997); Henry. G. Grabowski &
John M. Vernon, Brand Loyaly, Entry, and Price Competition in PharmaceuticalsAfter the 1984 Drug
Act, 35 J.L. & EcoN. 331 (1992).
128. Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, Does Intellectual Property Restrict Output? An Analysis of PharmaceuticalMarkets, 55 J.L. & EcON. 151, 152 (2012).
129. See Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Don't Fence Me In: FragmentedMarketsfor Technology and the
Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms, 50 MGMT. Sci. 804, 808 (2004) (describing the life cycle of

high-tech patents).
130. See Hemphill, supra note 47, at 1561-67 (describing in detail the operation of the HatchWaxman Act). The Hatch-Waxman Act has several design flaws that make it subject to substantial
abuse, see id. at 1571-72, but those flaws do not affect the system of enhanced penalties described here.
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patent functions as a mechanism for taxing the genuine innovation in which the
competitor has engaged. This in turn harms consumers of the patent challenger's products, who are forced to pay higher prices because of this tax. The
enhanced penalties paid to patent challengers would compensate them, in the
aggregate, for the risk that they will be unfairly taxed at trial. As the costs of
innovation decrease, so too will the prices of patent challengers' goods. The end
beneficiaries will be the consumers who have been shouldering the costs of
unmeritorious litigation all along.
D. RELATED APPROACHES

1. The English Rule
The solution we offer above bears a family resemblance to a more pedigreed
legal mechanism: the "loser-pays" system known as the "English Rule." In
jurisdictions that have adopted the English Rule, the losing party in litigation
must pay the prevailing party's costs and attorneys' fees.13 1 If courts and juries
in patent cases are accurate most of the time, then applying the English Rule
should be generally beneficial; holders of strong patents would see their rewards
increase, and holders of weak patents would see theirs diminish. Yet we do not
believe that it would be appropriate to straightforwardly apply the English Rule
in patent cases.
There is an extensive literature on the advantages and disadvantages of the
English Rule, in comparison to the standard American Rule in which both sides
bear their own costs, 1 3 2 and we will not recapitulate that literature here.' 3 3 It
suffices to note three particular reasons why we do not believe that the English
Rule is advisable or adequate. First, it is well understood that the English Rule
can cause distortions in litigation behavior by encouraging litigants to increase
their litigation expenditures, figuring that their opponents will eventually have
to pay.13 4 The greater the differential in resources between the two sides, the
greater the distortions: a wealthy litigant can threaten to effectively bankrupt a
131. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982

DuKE L.J. 651, 651 (1982) ("The English routinely include an assessment for a reasonable attorney's
fee in the costs to be borne by a losing party .... ).
132. Id. ("With its general rule that each side in civil litigation has ultimate responsibility for its own
lawyer's fees and that the system will not require the loser to pay anything toward the winner's
representation, this country stands in a small minority among the industrialized democracies.").
133. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation: Balancing
Fairnessand Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 877, 896 (1987) (explaining that

"under the English rule, the interests of attorney and client often can differ: the attorney may want to
prosecute a weak or marginal case in order to earn a fee even when the client-who would be liable for
the fees of both sides if the action were unsuccessful-would not"); Avery Katz, Measuring the
Demandfor Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 143 (1987); John F.
Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person'sAccess to Justice, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1567 (1993).
134. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their

Resolution, 27 J. EcoN. Lrr. 1067, 1073 (1989) (summarizing literature on the English Rule and
cost-increasing behavior).
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poorer opponent in the event of victory.' 3 5 This is especially important in the
context of patent disputes between small startup companies and large commercial firms, which we described in Part II above. There, the problem is that
litigation costs are relatively minor for the large commercial entity but enormous for the much smaller firm, impinging upon the smaller firm's ability to
effectively defend its patents. Forcing the smaller firm to account for the risk of
bearing the larger firm's costs would only exacerbate this problem.
One partial solution might be to institute an "infringer-pays" rule, rather than
the neutral English Rule. Under such a rule, a defendant held liable for
infringement would pay the plaintiff's costs and fees, but a defeated plaintiff
would not be responsible for the defendant's fees. 1 3 6 This would shield plaintiff
start-up companies from huge losses in the event that they were defeated by
larger competitors. However, it would not solve the correlative problem of
larger firms using their extensive portfolios to threaten smaller competitors who
possess valuable patents.1 37 If those threats became litigation, the smaller firms
would still be at risk of financial ruin in the event that they lost. Of course, a
finding that the small firm had infringed the larger firm's patents might have
exactly the same effect, making the addition of attorneys' fees irrelevant.
Accordingly, an infringer-pays rule might be preferable.13 8
Yet this raises the second problem with the English Rule: it could unreasonably diminish incentives to bring patent challenges, including worthwhile challenges to invalid patents.13 9 As we explained above, worthwhile patent challenges
produce public goods.' 40 Consequently, there are generally fewer patent challenges than would be optimal. The English Rule would exacerbate this problem
by increasing the penalties for unsuccessful patent challenges, further dissuading potential challengers from litigating. It is for this reason that we advocate
paying successful patent owners through patent extensions, rather than forcing
patent challengers to shoulder the cost. One could imagine instead instituting a
"plaintiff-pays" rule, in which only unsuccessful patent plaintiffs must shoulder
135. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, From "Loser Pays" to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules:
Reconciling Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1863, 1871-72 (1998) (detailing

the wealth differential, but also noting that in the extreme case the effect may be reversed by the
presence of a judgment-proof party).
136. An analogous rule in federal constitutional litigation is that parties that prevail on constitutional
claims against a state or local government actor receive attorney's fees, while those that lose do not
have to pay the government's fees for defending against those claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)
(awarding reasonable attorney fees to parties prevailing in § 1983 actions).
137. See supra sections II.A.3 & II.B.2.
138. Another potential wrinkle is an exception to the English Rule for small firms. This would
eliminate the possibility that a larger commercial entity could drive a small startup out of business
simply by running up litigation costs. Nonetheless, we do not believe that is the paramount concern, as
we explained above. A finding that a small startup has infringed a larger firm's patents will likely have
the same effect. This wrinkle also would not solve the problem described below.
139. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Background Paper, Study on Paths to a "Better Way":
Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DuKE L.J. 824, 888 (1989) (describing the incentive

effects of the English Rule).
140. See supra section III.C.
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the other side's costs. But this would merely return to the problems described in
the paragraphs above.
Additionally, it is worth noting that at the time of this writing, a bill has been
introduced in the House of Representatives that would establish a similarly
asymmetric fee-shifting rule. The "Shield Act" would allow courts to order
patent plaintiffs to pay alleged infringers' attorneys' fees-"upon making a
determination that the party alleging the infringement of the patent did not have
a reasonable likelihood of succeeding."14 The bill is incomplete and flawed as
currently written. It would do nothing to compensate holders of valuable patents
for the risk that their patents might be erroneously overturned, and in fact it
would only reduce the value of those patents further. But it nonetheless represents a promising step in the right direction.
None of these formulations of the fee-shifting rule eliminates the third
shortcoming of that approach: that litigation costs constitute an extremely small
fraction of the potential lost value of a patent in the event of an erroneous
judicial decision. Holders of valuable patents face two sorts of costs when they
become targets: litigation costs and costs associated with the possibility that a
patent will be mistakenly held invalid (or not infringed). The former cost is not
insignificant, but it can be dwarfed by the latter. The average patent case that is
litigated to final judgment costs each side on the order of $5 million. 14 2 Yet a
single patent-particularly a patent on a successful pharmaceutical-could be
worth hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars per year. Consider a
patent valued at $500 million that is 10% likely to be invalidated at trial. Each
time that patent's owner goes to trial, the litigation costs represent less than 10%
of the total expected loss that litigation presents. 14 3 Thus the English Rule,
standing alone, is far from a full solution.
2. Insurance Claims and Fraud
To the best of our knowledge there is no legal system that formally replicates
the structure of enhanced rewards and penalties that we have described here.
However, a rough facsimile has developed in the field of insurance law.1" If an
insurance claimant files a fraudulent claim, she runs the risk of not only having
that claim denied but also facing criminal penalties for insurance fraud. 14 5 On
the other hand, if an insurance claimant files a valid claim and the insurer
unreasonably or fraudulently denies the claim, the claimant can in some cases

141. Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2012, H.R.
6245, 112th Cong. § 2(a).
142. See supra note 64.

143. The cost to the patent holder in terms of the risk that the patent will be invalidated is $500
million x 10% = $50 million. If the litigation costs another $5 million, the total cost is $55 million, of
which the litigation cost accounts for 9%.
144. We thank Todd Henderson for suggesting this point.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Irons, 53 F.3d 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1995).
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collect punitive damages from the insurance company.14 6 Insurance law thus
functions as a two-sided system of enhanced rewards and penalties, at least in
extreme cases. We can think of the insurance claimant as standing in the shoes
of the patent holder, and the insurance company in the role of the alleged
infringer.
There is a potential concern that the possibility of enhanced rewardspunitive damages for fraudulent denial of an insurance claim-could lead
insured parties to sandbag their insurers. The insured would withhold key
information in an attempt to induce the insurer to deny the claim and then
deploy that information in order to convince a court that the insurer's actions
had been fraudulent. A system of enhanced rewards and penalties could conceivably become counterproductive if such behavior migrated to patent law.
To the extent that this concern even exists in insurance law,14 7 we do not
believe that it would be present in patent law. The premise behind such
chicanery is that insured parties possess private information about their claims
or themselves. It is this private information that they are able to first withhold
and then deploy. But patentees possess no such private information; the patent,
its prosecution history, and all relevant prior art are all public. There is nothing
for the patentee to withhold and thus no opportunity for such strategic behavior.148
If verdicts in patent cases tend to be inaccurate, it would seem misguided to
suggest raising the stakes of those cases-but that is precisely what we propose
here. Providing enhanced rewards for patent owners who succeed at trial and
enhanced penalties for owners who fail would force owners of valid and invalid
patents to self-sort. Owners of valid, valuable patents would realize greater
rewards from asserting those patents, and thus greater incentives to innovate in
the first instance. Owners of invalid patents would have substantially less to
gain at trial and thus less ability to extract rents from genuine innovators. Such a
system of heightened rewards and penalties would have substantial salutary
effects, even if courts never became more accurate.

146. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 413-15 (2003).
147. Insurance law has mechanisms to deal with this type of problem, such as the fact that the cause
of action requires that the insurer have acted in bad faith.
To show a claim for bad faith, a plaintiff must show the absence of a reasonable basis for
denying benefits of the policy and the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack
of a reasonable basis for denying the claim. It is apparent, then, that the tort of bad faith is an
intentional one.
Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (1978).
148. Of course, the patentee could refrain from publicizing the existence of the patent. But this is
precisely what patentees are already doing. See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and
Copyright, 90 VA. L. REv. 465, 471 (2004).
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IV. REFINEMENTS AND CAVEATS

So far we have laid out the basic theory behind our proposal for raising the
stakes in patent cases. As we have explained, policymakers need not estimate
courts' error rates precisely or calculate reward and penalty multipliers perfectly
for our proposal to improve the patent system. All that is necessary is that
(1) courts and parties are more than 50% accurate-that is, better than a coin
flip; and (2) the supplemental penalties and rewards are greater than zero. So
long as these two conditions are met, any implementation would represent an
improvement from the status quo.
But policymakers could, in fact, do much better if they so chose. In the
sections that follow, we highlight a number of refinements that would enhance
the effectiveness of our proposal in substantial ways. We also address a number
of potential problems with such a system and provide workable solutions. First,
we describe how policymakers could tailor a system of enhanced rewards and
benefits to particular inventive industries, applying enhanced rewards in industries where patents are generally valuable and the risk of erroneous invalidation
is highest, and enhanced penalties in industries characterized by excessive
patenting and patent holdup. We then discuss how our proposal might be
implemented and by which institutional actors. We analyze the effects of
enhanced rewards and penalties on settlement behavior, and' we close by
addressing the problems that arise if patent plaintiffs are judgment-proof.
A. INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC TREATMENT

The system of enhanced rewards and penalties that we propose will effectively separate holders of valid and invalid patents by adjusting their incentives
at trial. But it might be possible to increase the specificity and precision of this
system by applying it piecemeal. Certain types of lawsuits would be eligible for
enhanced rewards but not penalties; other types of lawsuits could be opened to
enhanced penalties but not rewards.
For instance, consider the role of nonpracticing entities (NPEs). These are
firms that do not actually produce or market any product or service and often do
no research, either. Instead, they simply own patents and use those patents to
secure licensing fees or litigation judgments against productive commercial
firms. It might be possible to take advantage of the statistic that NPEs file a
disproportionate share of the lawsuits in which invalid patents are asserted.14 9
That is, a lawsuit brought by an NPE is more likely to involve an overbroad or
invalid patent, or one that contributed no useful innovation, than is a lawsuit
brought by a commercial firm. If the goal is to avoid benefitting holders of these
sorts of patents, NPEs should be separated from other types of patent plaintiffs.
The most direct method for accomplishing this would be to withhold en149. Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform,
24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1603-04 (2009) (describing the role of non-practicing entities and the

types of lawsuits they initiate).
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hanced rewards from any patent plaintiff that has not produced a product in the
technological area covered by its patent in suit. One could even imagine very
particular tests: for instance, plaintiffs will not be eligible for enhanced remedies unless they have made $X million in sales of a product covered by the
patent at suit.
There are a number of problems with this approach. The first is that it would
disadvantage small startup companies and other firms that might eventually
become commercial entities but have not yet produced products. (It also might
be seen as an invitation to infringe patents that have simply not yet been
commercialized.) However, this will be an issue with any sorting mechanism
based around whether a firm is an NPE. A firm's NPE status is not a perfect
proxy for the true variable of interest-whether the firm is asserting an invalid
or overbroad patent. Using it as a proxy will inevitably lead to errors of
over-inclusion (start-up firms) and under-inclusion (commercial firms asserting
invalid patents).
The larger flaw with this sorting mechanism is that it would incentivize firms
to evade it by simply transferring their patents to other companies. Consider a
true patent troll, P, a firm that exists only to hold patents and assert them against
commercial entities. Imagine that it holds a patent that could plausibly cover a
product produced by both Firm A and Firm B, two large commercial firms.
Under this rule, P could not obtain enhanced remedies against either Firm A or
Firm B. Instead, it could choose to sell the patent to Firm A. Firm A would be
willing to pay P the expected value of P's suit against Firm A, plus the expected
value of Firm A's potential suit against Firm B. The expected value of that suit
would involve enhanced remedies because Firm A manufactures a product
covered by the patent. P would have enhanced the value of its property right
simply by transferring it to a different type of party.' 50 Not only would this
frustrate the purpose of a rule excluding NPEs from accessing enhanced patent
remedies, it would also create incentives for firms to expend resources on
transfers of intellectual property rights that create no social wealth whatsoever
and produce transaction costs.
This concern is mitigated somewhat by the rarity of large commercial
competitors litigating infringement suits against one another to judgment."5 '
The reason is that they have too much to lose: in many cases, each firm holds a

150. Firm A and P would presumably split the value of the enhanced remedies between them,
according to their relative bargaining power. This would mean that part of the "tax" being paid by Firm
B would go to Firm A, where it might well be redirected towards valuable research. A smaller share
would go to P as a true tax on valuable innovation. This makes this particular solution somewhat more
appealing.
151. This is not to say that large firms do not file suit against one another. See Chien, supra note 80,
at 1572 ("I found that public and large private companies initiated 42% of all lawsuits studied, 28% of
the time against other large companies . . . ."). The difference is that monetary awards are rarely the
outcome or the objective of large-firm litigation. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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substantial portfolio of patents that the other firm is plausibly infringing.' 5 2 If
one firm were to file suit, it would risk a countersuit that could be just as
damaging.' 5 3 Both firms would expend millions of dollars in litigation costs
without gaining a clear advantage. For this reason, larger commercial firms
typically prefer to enter into cross-licensing agreements with one another, rather
than litigating to judgment.15 4 In addition, the patents held by trolls may be
duplicative of patents already held by these large commercial firmsparticularly when it comes to devices that are covered by hundreds or even
thousands of patents.' 5 5 In the hands of a large commercial firm, one additional
patent may confer little additional value. Nonetheless, it is always possible that
a patent troll would be able to find a higher value commercial buyer for its
patents, resulting in wasteful transactions and evasion of the limits on heightened remedies.
In light of this, an industry-focused approach might be superior. This approach takes advantage of the fact that certain industries and areas of technology are characterized by substantial activity by NPEs and patent trolls, whereas
others are not. One could consider awarding enhanced rewards only to victorious patent plaintiffs who hold patents in industries and technical fields that do
not involve significant activity by trolls: pharmaceutical drugs, biotechnology,
medical devices, chemicals, optics, machinery, and the like.' 56 Victorious plaintiffs in industries with significant activity by patent trolls-software, computers,
electronics, semiconductors, and similar fields-would be denied access to
these enhanced remedies. In symmetric fashion, one could consider limiting the
availability of enhanced penalties to industries with substantial troll activity.
This proposal draws upon a literature suggesting that courts are already
creating different patent rules for different industries 5 7 and recommending that
Congress or the PTO do the same even more explicitly.15 8 There is also a direct
analogy to the Supreme Court's approach to injunctive remedies in eBay v.
MercExchange, in which several concurring Justices noted that not all indus-

152. See Colleen V. Chien, FromArms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its
Implicationsfor the PatentSystem, 62 HASTINGs L.J. 297, 299 (2010).

153. Id. ("To guard against the risk of patent litigation, companies acquire patents so they can
retaliate against or neutralize threats of suits brought by their competitors.").
154. See id. at 307-10.
155. See, e.g., David Drummond, When Patents Attack Android, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Aug. 3,

2011), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/when-patents-attack-android.html ("A smartphone might
involve as many as 250,000 (largely questionable) patent claims, and our competitors want to impose a
'tax' for these dubious patents that makes Android devices more expensive for consumers.").
156. See, e.g., Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls: The Divergent
Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 689, 693 (2006) ("Large biotechnology,

medical, and pharmaceutical companies (biotech/pharma) do not face the same threat that their
info-tech counterparts face.").
157. See generally id.

158. See Masur, supra note 92, at 279.
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tries, and not all patent plaintiffs, are equivalent.' 59 Where there is an especially
high risk of patent holdup, or where there is reason to believe that the plaintiff's
assertion of its patent rights will hinder rather than promote innovation, the
Court hinted that it disfavored injunctive relief.16 0 To date, these types of
industry-by-industry adjustments have been made largely by the courts,' 6 '
though Congressl6 and the PTO have intervened on limited occasions. 163It
may be appropriate for the courts to take the lead again here, or it might be
advantageous for Congress or an administrative agency to play a significant
role. The institutional details are interesting and important but beyond the scope
of this Article. What is important is that industry-by-industry distinctions such
as the one we are proposing are hardly foreign to patent law.
Could this arrangement similarly be gamed by opportunistic patent trolls?
One option would be for trolls to simply cease activity in a given industry,
goading courts into offering enhanced remedies, before resuming litigious
activities. Yet, this is highly improbable for a number of reasons. If trolls could
convince courts to allow enhanced remedies by ceasing activity, courts presumably would turn the spigot back off once trolls resumed litigation. Patent trolls
would also cost themselves a tremendous amount of money by ceasing activity
simply to tap into greater enhanced remedies at some future date. Furthermore,
patent trolls would also have to engage in a significant amount of concerted
action (actually, nonaction) in order to implement this plan. This creates a
severe collective action problem-any given patent troll would benefit enormously from defecting from an agreement and continuing to litigate.
A more likely possibility is that trolls might migrate from the technical fields
they currently inhabit to other industries (such as pharmaceuticals) where the
remedies are more generous. If it became standard practice for patent trolls to
"follow the money" in this fashion,' any strategy that relied upon distinctions
between industries would be quickly eroded.
However, it is extremely difficult-if not impossible-for patent trolls to take
up residence within another industry or technical field. The reason has nothing
to do with the expertise within those firms or the types of patents owned by
trolls. If those were the barriers, trolls could simply hire experts in other

159. EBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("An
industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but,
instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.").
160. Id. at 396-97 ("When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the
companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an
injunction may not serve the public interest.").
161. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 13
(2009).
162. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B) (2006).
163. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
164. See Memorable Quotes for All the President's Men, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.

imdb.comLtitle/tt0074119/quotes (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
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technical areas and purchase other patents. Rather, some industries are simply
more conducive to predatory patent behavior than others. The reason appears to
be that it is easier in some fields than others to specify an invention for purposes
of a patent. In the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, for instance, a
patentee can specify a drug or chemical with a great deal of precision by
describing the molecule involved. Any given invention is usually covered by
only a small number of significant patentsl 6 5-hence the principle "one molecule covers one drug."166 Consequently, old patents can rarely be reinterpreted
in broad fashion to cover new inventions. The opportunities for trolls are greatly
limited. It is for this reason that these industries-and others, such as machinery
and optics-are not generally thought to have many trolls currently operating. If
trolls could gain a foothold litigating in these fields, they would already have
done so; there is no reason for them to have artificially confined their activity to
certain industries. The relative absence of troll-like behavior is therefore best
understood as a function of the way in which patents interact with and describe
the relevant technology.
Accordingly, we believe that it will be possible to obtain the advantages of
enhanced remedies while minimizing the harm done by patent trolls by limiting
these enhanced remedies by industry. There will be some definitional issues at
the margins-parties may argue over whether a particular patent covers computers or machinery, for instance-but these are the types of issues that courts are
well-equipped to decide.' 67 The distinctions we seek to draw are necessarily
crude, but here these crude distinctions may function better than either finer
distinctions, which can be gamed, or the status quo.
B. IMPLEMENTATION AND MEASUREMENT

The proposal we have described is not one that could be easily implemented
by courts under current law. To begin with, there is no provision in law that
would allow courts to assess the types of enhanced rewards and penalties that
we advocate. The Patent Act permits courts to "increase the damages [found by
a jury] up to three times the amount found or assessed," 16 8 and courts have
employed this provision to assess treble damages in cases of "willful" infringe-

165. A drug might have multiple patents on the form in which it is delivered or the dosage rate, but
only one patent on the underlying molecular form. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About
Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REv. 149, 150 (2007) ("In particular, the one

central fact about the information technology (IT) sector-including the Internet, semiconductors,
telecommunications, computer hardware, and computer software-is the multiplicity of patents that
developers must deal with. This is not a problem pharmaceutical companies generally encounter.").
166. Id.
167. For that matter, the PTO classifies every patent by technology area as a matter of course. It does
so in order to assign patent applications to the proper examiners when they are filed. If courts prove
incapable of drawing consistent and meaningful distinctions between technological fields, the PTO
might prove to be a worthy substitute. See Masur, supra note 92, at 312.
168. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
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ment.' 6 9 The Patent Act also permits courts to award attorneys' fees in "exceptional cases."170 Importantly, however, both provisions only allow courts to
increase the amount paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. There is no law that
would enable courts to award heightened damages paid out of public funds, and
no mechanism for penalizing patent plaintiffs who bring unmeritorious suits."
In addition, our proposal relies on determining the (approximate) accuracy of
courts across patent cases. We have no illusion of courts' ability to ascertain this
figure themselves. The judges of a court do not have the time to scrutinize one
another's opinions for error; nor would they be eager to point out their colleagues' errors even if they discovered them.17 2
Accordingly, legislative or administrative action will be necessary. Congress
could implement such an arrangement by legislation or (perhaps preferably)
could delegate the task to an administrative agency.173 In either event, a panel of
outside experts should be tasked with reviewing a random sample of completed
patent cases and determining courts' error rate.
C. SETTLEMENT

Thus far our discussion has focused on outcomes at trial, and we have only
alluded to licensing and settlement negotiations. These negotiations make up a
significant fraction of the economic activity surrounding patents, but our general
neglect of them has been deliberate. The reason is simple: settlement and
licensing occur in the shadow of expected trial outcomes.17 4 The more that a

169. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Absent a statutory
guide, we have held that an award of enhanced damages requires a showing of willful infringement.").
170. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
171. The closest available legal remedy is Rule 11 sanctions. See FED. R. Civ P. 11(c). Yet Rule 11
sanctions are typically quite small (in the thousands or tens of thousands of dollars), rather than the
millions we suggest awarding in enhanced penalties. Herbert Kritzer, Lawrence Marshall & Frances
Kahn Zemans, Rule 11: Moving Beyond the Cosmic Anecdote, 75 JUDICATURE 269, 270 (1992) ("The

median sanction is $2,500-that is to say 50 per cent of monetary sanctions awarded were for less than
$2,500. A full two-thirds of the sanction awards were for $5,000 or less."); see also Joseph J. Brecher,
The Public Interest and Intimidation Suits: A New Approach, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 105, 137 (1988)
("Furthermore, the typical sanction award is a relatively minimal amount and is usually imposed
against an attorney, rather than his client."). Moreover, Rule 11 sanctions are traditionally applied only
in extraordinary circumstances, whereas we propose enhanced penalties in every case where a patent is
found invalid. Robert Kasunic, Preserving the Traditional Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM. J.L. &

ARrs 397, 424 nn.95-96 (2007) (noting that that the "imposition of [Rule 11] sanctions is rare" and
courts have "typically reserved [sanctions] only for egregious cases").
172. See RicHARD A. POSNER, How JuDGEs THINK 131-35 (2008) (describing the value that judges
place on collegiality).
173. See Masur, supra note 92, at 279 (suggesting that the PTO be afforded general rule making
authority).
174. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case

of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (setting forth the seminal model of settlement bargaining); see also
Robert Cooter et al., Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11
J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982) (expanding on the Mnookin & Kornhauser model); Steven Shavell, Suit,
Settlement, and Trial: A TheoreticalAnalysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal

Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982) (same).
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plaintiff and defendant believe the plaintiff will win at trial, the greater the
amount they will settle for (in the event that they settle).175 The less the plaintiff
has to gain at trial, the lower the settlement price.17 6 Accordingly, a system of
enhanced rewards and penalties will increase the amount that owners of valid,
valuable patents will earn in licensing negotiations and decrease the amount that
owners of invalid patents will be able to extract. These changes in settlement
outcomes will mirror the changes in expected trial outcomes.',
Nor should a symmetric system of enhanced rewards and penalties affect the
likelihood of settlement. Settlement is valuable because it allows both sides to
avoid the substantial expense involved in litigating. 7 1 When parties fail to
settle, it is typically because they disagree on the likely outcome of the case. 17 9
If either party has private information that leads her to believe that she is more
likely to win, the two sides will not be able to come to an agreement.so That is,
the decision to litigate rather than settle is driven by differences in information.
Here, the system of enhanced rewards and penalties introduces no private or
asymmetric information. Both parties will have the same information regarding
the multipliers used to calculate enhanced rewards and penalties, and both
parties will be able to perform the same calculations to the same degree of
accuracy. If the parties would be inclined to settle absent a system of enhanced
rewards and penalties, the introduction of that system will not dissuade them.
The one factor that could impact settlement is the proposal we outlined above
for paying victorious patent plaintiffs from general tax revenues or via a patent
term extension, rather than forcing losing defendants to pay. The reason is that
this third-partypayment to plaintiffs decouples plaintiffs' and defendants' incentives, making trial worth more to plaintiffs if they have valuable patents.
Consider a simple numerical example. Suppose that a plaintiff is 80% likely to
prevail at trial, damages in the case will be $100 million, and the cost of
litigating will be $10 million for each side. Absent a system of enhanced
rewards and penalties, plaintiff's expected payoff from going to trial would be:

175. Shavell, supra note 174, at 67.
176. Id.
177. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 174, at 971 (elaborating on this point).
178. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedureand JudicialAdministration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 418 (1973).
179. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.

1, 9-12 (1984).
180. See id. at 9 (describing the role of differential beliefs in settlement). Note that in the text we
only consider the case where there is symmetric uncertainty that leads to differential beliefs. We do not
consider the case where one side has systematically better information. Even if one thought, for
example, that the patent holder had better information on validity, the outcome of the settlement game
depends on who is able to make a final take-it-or-leave-it offer. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. EcoN. 404, 405, 414 (1984)

(describing model in which the less informed party makes the final offer); Jennifer F. Reinganum &
Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J. EcON. 557,

558-59 (1986) (describing model in which the better informed party has ability to make final offer). We
certainly do not know a priori who has that sort of bargaining power.
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($100 million X 0.8) - $10 million = $70 million.

Defendant's expected payoff from going to trial would be:
(-$100 million X 0.8) - $10 million = -$90

million.

Plaintiff and defendant thus should be willing to settle for any amount between
$70 million and $90 million.
Now consider the effect of adding enhanced rewards and penalties equal to
$10 million, with the reward coming via a patent term extension rather than
from defendants. Plaintiff's expected payoff from going to trial would be:
($110 million X 0.8) - ($10 million X 0.2) - $10 million = $76 million.

Note that the plaintiff obtains an additional $10 million if she wins (with
probability 0.8), but loses $10 million if she loses (with probability 0.2).
Defendant's expected payoff from going to trial would be:
(-$100 million X 0.8) + ($10 million X 0.2) - $10 million

=

-$88 million.
Whereas the plaintiff's enhanced gain does not come from the defendant's
pocket, her loss does go to the defendant. Plaintiff and defendant would then be
willing to settle only for any amount between $76 million and $88 million. The
available bargaining range has shrunk from $20 million ($90 million - $70
million) to $12 million ($88 million - $76 million). This will decrease the
likelihood of settlement.18 1
The result will be fewer settlements on the whole and more patent trials. This
would most likely increase social welfare with respect to invalid or dubious
patents because those patents will be invalidated at trial and cannot later be
asserted against other alleged infringers. But it will decrease social welfare with
respect to valid patents by forcing the parties to incur litigation costs that might
otherwise have been avoided. The net effects will be ambiguous and will
depend on the percentages of asserted patents that are valid and invalid. This
might constitute an argument for eschewing the asymmetric mechanism we
recommend in which plaintiffs pay enhanced penalties to patent challengers but
are paid enhanced remedies by the public.
The important point is that enhanced rewards and penalties will improve

181. See Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. Rav. 1, 6 (2002); see also
Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J.
73, 101 (1990) ("[lIt is natural-as well as customary in the legal and economic literature-to assume
that the likelihood of settlement is positively related to the width of the settlement zone.").
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settlement outcomes for holders of valid patents and worsen them for holders of
invalid patents. For instance, in the numerical example above, the midpoint of
the bargaining range absent enhanced rewards and penalties is $80 million. That
midpoint rises to $82 million once enhanced rewards and penalties are introduced. The salutary effects of enhanced rewards and penalties will persist
irrespective of whether litigants settle their cases or proceed to trial.
D. RISK AVERSION

One concern with our proposal for enhanced rewards and penalties is that
they increase the amount of litigation risk to which the patent holder and
challenger are exposed. To the extent that these parties are risk averse,18 2 our
proposal would appear to reduce these parties' welfare. This is not a critical
objection to our basic proposal because parties can ensure against litigation risk
by settling cases. In the basic settlement model we employed in the last section,
a reduction in utility or corporate welfare due to risk aversion to larger litigation
stakes operates just like a litigation cost-it reduces the patent holder's gain
from litigating and increases the patent challenger's loss from litigating. The
combined effect is to reduce the parties' utility from going to trial, making
settlement even more attractive. If the parties settle, they do not face the same
litigation risk.
Interestingly, risk aversion offsets part of the problem raised by the variant of
our proposal that has enhanced rewards funded partly by taxpayers or future
consumers. In the previous section we explained that this decoupling of enhanced rewards from defendant payments increases the amount that the plaintiff
expects to obtain at trial more than it increases the amount that the defendant
expects to pay at trial. Because the scope for settlement is proportional to the
amount that the defendant expects to pay above and beyond what the plaintiff
expects to receive, decoupled enhanced rewards reduce the scope for settlement.
For reasons we gave in the last paragraph, however, decoupled enhanced
rewards also increase the plaintiff's cost of litigation due to risk aversion. This
reduces the payoff that patent holders can expect from trial, offsetting some of
the increased return from decoupled enhanced rewards. The offset is not
complete because the enhanced reward is similar to a strictly positive value
lottery. Positive value lotteries-for example, heads you win $5 and tails you
win $10-have positive value to both risk-averse and non-risk-averse individuals. That is, both individuals would pay a positive amount to face the lottery,
though the risk-averse individual would be willing to pay less than the non-riskaverse individual to face it. In summary, risk aversion reduces some (but not all)
of the anticipated returns to enhanced rewards and penalties, and also amelio182. Corporate parties may behave in a risk-averse fashion either because owners or managers are
actually risk averse or because they face a risk that threatens a company's existence. In general, smaller
firms are more likely to behave in a risk-averse fashion than larger firms, either because smaller firms
have fewer and perhaps less diversified owners or because any given level of risk is more likely to
bankrupt a small firm than a big firm.
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rates some of the reduction in settlement rates caused by decoupled enhanced
rewards.
E. INSOLVENT PLAINTIFFS AND SHAM LAWSUITS

We close with two relatively discrete but important issues. First, it is essential
that patent plaintiffs have the capacity to pay enhanced penalties if they lose at
trial. Patent plaintiffs could conceivably evade their responsibility for enhanced
penalties by transferring their patents to under-funded shell corporations and
then using those corporations to bring suit. If the suit failed, the corporation
would not have the resources to pay the penalty judgment.
This is a real problem but one that is easily addressed. Patent plaintiffs should
be forced to either post a litigation bond or purchase insurance against being
assessed an enhanced penalty.183 The bond or insurance would be pegged to the
damages demanded by the plaintiff: the greater the damages, the greater the
bond or insurance.
Second, and lastly, it is always possible that patent holders will take advantage of the prospect of supplemental rewards by arranging sham lawsuits, which
they then win at trial. Sham suits present a real concern, but they are hardly
unique to this context-patent law offers numerous opportunities for patent
holders and challengers to gain advantages via sham lawsuits. 1 8 4 As in other
areas of patent law, they can be policed through other means, principally an
examination of connections between the plaintiff and defendant in a given suit
and the parties with economic interests on both sides of the case.185 The PTO
has already begun to take steps in this direction.18 6 The threat of fraud thus does
not provide an adequate basis for rejecting supplemental patent remedies.
CONCLUSION

In this paper we have documented how patent challenges and patent law's ex
post attempt to correct mistakes made by the PTO can undermine the initial
goals of patents. Because of mistakes in the selection of patents by challengers
and errors by courts in determining which patents are valid, patent challenges
can penalize valid patents, thereby discouraging innovation, and protect some
invalid patents, sustaining deadweight loss and taxing true innovation. One
solution to the problem is to make patent challengers and courts more accurate.
Where that is difficult, we propose an alternative, counterintuitive solution:
increase the stakes in patent challenges. We recommend that patent owners
183. See generally Robert J. Rhee, Bonding Limited Liability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1417 (2010)
(describing the use of litigation bonds and similar instruments).
184. See Timothy Denny Greene, "All Substantial Rights": Toward Sensible Patent Licensee
Standing, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 35-37 (2012).
185. Federal law already requires that any civil action be "prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest." FED. R. Civ. P. 17.
186. See Tony Dutra, Stakeholders at PTO Roundtable Recommend Reporting Real Party in Interest
Changes Only, 85 PAT., TRADEMARK & CoPYRIirr J. 419 (Jan. 24, 2013).
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whose patents are upheld at trial be given a reward-in the form of a patent
extension-on top of the damages they usually get in court. Similarly, patent
owners whose patents are held invalid by a court should be forced to pay a
penalty to patent challengers. This will increase the wedge between the payoffs
of having a patent upheld in courts and having it struck down by a court. So
long as courts are better than a coin flip at determining whether a patent is truly
valid, this approach will reward holders of truly valid patents and punish
holders of truly invalid patents. Courts need not be perfectly accurate for our
solution to work. Indeed, the higher stakes are a substitute for more accuracy.
Although our proposal seems bold, it is actually fairly narrow. Whereas we
only use higher stakes to correct for skewed incentives created by imperfect
patent challenges, higher stakes can also be used to correct for other flaws in the
patent system, including the possibility that supracompetitive profits from market exclusivity may not fully capture the full social gains from innovation'" or
that market exclusivity may discourage follow-on innovation.' 88 In some sense,
this is not at all surprising. Because the threat of damages awarded by courts is
ultimately how patent laws are enforced, those laws can be changed substantially by altering damages that courts award.
Although manipulating the stakes in patent challenges can be used to tackle
broader issues of patent policy, the choice between addressing the problem of
imperfect challenges by increasing the accuracy of courts or by changing the
patent approval- process does not depend on the resolution of those underlying
questions about patent policy. Whether one thinks that current patent law
undercompensates for innovation or that its breadth deters future innovation,
improvements in accuracy and increases in stakes will both address the problem. The point we wish to highlight is that increased accuracy and increased
stakes are substitutes.
Although we make our two basic observations-that litigation is mistakeprone and that higher stakes can correct some of that error-in the context of
patent challenges, it also applies outside patent law. In general, it is important to
model not just the incentive effects of a given legal rule but also the incentives
to litigate that rule. Those litigation incentives can introduce errors into application of the basic legal rule, reducing the efficacy of the rule. Moreover, litigation
errors can be corrected either by directly improving the accuracy of litigation or,
surprisingly in some cases, by increasing the stakes in litigation. Increasing
stakes is a plausible substitute for greater accuracy when litigants and courts,
although not perfectly accurate, are at least better than random at identifying
truly legal and illegal behavior.

187. See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 1, at 529.
188. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in BiomedicalResearch, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).

